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ABSTRACT 
 While historical ties between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia date back 
centuries, interaction between these regions in the twentieth century has traditionally 
been limited to religiopolitical engagements such as the hajj, or the movement of labor 
and remittances. In the last decade, the strategic value of Southeast Asia has risen 
dramatically for a number of reasons, including the growth of the region’s economies as 
well as the rise of India, China, and other great powers. Emerging concurrently with 
major economic restructuring in the Middle East and the changing security dynamics of 
the Persian Gulf, there is little doubt that the political, economic, and military interactions 
of these regions will grow. Given the growing diversity of Arab interactions in the region, 
this raises the question, is Southeast Asia emerging as a zone of competition between 
Arab Gulf states? While the literature on ties between Asia and the Middle East is 
growing, contemporary studies of inter-Arab competition in Southeast Asia are largely 
missing. Through the analytical framework of Regional Security Complex Theory, this 
thesis concludes that Gulf Arab outreach to Southeast Asia is neither cooperative nor 
competitive, largely due to a lack of serious collective threats to the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) emerging from this region combined with a low degree of intra-Arab 
enmity. 
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In December 2019, Malaysia hosted high-level officials from Turkey, Qatar, and 
Iran, as well as a broad array of activists and leaders from across the Muslim world in a 
summit designed as a “platform for various Muslim leaders to address social, political, and 
economic issues in the Muslim world.”1 Notably absent from this summit were 
representatives from Saudi Arabia or the Saudi-led Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), which has traditionally served as the inter-governmental institution designed to 
address the plight of Muslims globally. While 2019 Kuala Lumpur Summit had signaled 
Malaysia’s intent to pursue a broader leadership role in the Muslim world, it had a larger 
impact in the Persian Gulf: it triggered a sense of insecurity in Saudi Arabia because the 
summit was organized outside the architecture of the OIC, threatening Saudi religious 
hegemony in the Islamic world.2 
International gatherings of Islamist parties in Southeast Asia are nothing new. In 
1988, Malaysia’s Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) coordinated the first gathering of 
Islamist parties and affiliated groups in a conference known as “The International 
Gathering for the Solidarity of Muslims.”3 Later in 2006 as a reaction to Israel’s war 
against Hezbollah, PAS organized the “Southeast Asian Islamic Organizations Roundtable 
Conference of Palestine and Lebanon in facing the Zionist and Anglo-American 
Imperialism.” Saudi representatives were dispatched to the 1988 conference, however they 
were not present in the 2006 conference. During this conference, the opening speech by 
former Malaysian Deputy High Commissioner to Singapore, Yeop Adlan Che Rose, 
 
1 Prashant Waikar and Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “The 2019 Kuala Lumpur Summit: A 
Strategic Realignment in the Muslim World?,” Berkley Forum, Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power 
Project, February 24, 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-2019-kuala-lumpur-summit-a-
strategic-realignment-in-the-muslim-world, para. 1. 
2 Waikar and Osman. 
3 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Arab Spring and Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia: Much Ado about 
Nothing?,” Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings, Rethinking Political Islam 
Series, August 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Southeast-Asia_Liow-
FINALE.pdf, 12. 
2 
criticized the Saudi-led OIC as “impotent” and called for “the mobilization of the Muslim 
ummah through a different platform.”4  
The absence of Saudi Arabia at the 2006 and 2019 summits, as well as Qatar’s 
presence in 2019 highlights a key question regarding the role of Arab states in Southeast 
Asian politics. Are we beginning to see new manifestations of inter-Arab competition for 
political influence in Southeast Asia? While inter-Arab competition is a subject that began 
to receive more attention after the Arab Spring in 2011 and the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar 
began in 2017 when the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council came into question, 
recent scholarship on this subject has focused largely on the Arab near-abroad. In recent 
years, Gulf Arab security interests in places like Yemen have expanded to zero-sum 
competitions for influence, resources, and access for Arab militaries and diplomats across 
the Red Sea in Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia.5 Southeast Asia has traditionally served as an 
arena of Arab cooperation, led by Saudi Arabia, and largely as an effort to contain and 
isolate Iranian influence.6 Little contemporary research has looked at the changing nature 
of Arab cooperation and competition in Southeast Asia, however. The purpose of this thesis 
is to address that research gap by expanding scholarship on this important topic. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
While historical ties between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia date back 
centuries, interaction between Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf in the twentieth century 
has traditionally been limited to religiopolitical engagements such as the hajj, the 
movement of labor and remittances, or limited travel for jihad in Iraq, Syria, and 
Indonesia.7 In the last decade, the strategic value of Southeast Asia has risen dramatically 
 
4 Liow, 13. 
5 Will Todman, “The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC States’ Foreign Policy Laboratory” 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 20, 2018), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulf-scramble-africa-gcc-states-foreign-policy-laboratory; Kristian Coates 
Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 
6 Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 62. 
7 Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Networks: Migration, Education, and Islam 
(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2020), 25; Michael Vatikiotis, Blood and Silk: Power and Conflict in 
Modern Southeast Asia (London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd, 2017), 230. 
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for a number of reasons, including the growth of the region’s economies as well as the rise 
of India, China, and other potential great powers. Emerging concurrently with major 
economic restructuring in the Middle East and the changing security dynamics of the 
Persian Gulf, there is little doubt that the political, economic, and military interactions of 
these regions will grow, making the rise of Southeast Asia of critical importance to the 
Middle East. Given the growing diversity of Arab interactions in the region, this raises the 
question, is Southeast Asia emerging as a zone of competition between Gulf Arab states? 
More specifically, how has the nature and intensity of Gulf Arab policy towards Southeast 
Asia changed since 2000? Are regional conditions emerging that would promote 
competition over cooperation, or vice versa? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research question is significant for several reasons. First, the relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia represents a key nexus within global Islam. The King 
of Saudi Arabia also assumes the self-appointed title of khadim al-haramain al-sharifain, 
or the “Custodian of the Two Holy Sites,” referring to Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two 
most important religious sites, as a means of legitimizing Saudi rule and to position 
themselves as leaders in the global Muslim community. While the modern usage of this 
title reappeared in 1982 when King Khaled rose to the Saudi throne, its etymology dates 
back to before the Ottoman Empire.8 The modern Saudi state was only established in 1932; 
the Al Saud royal family sees themselves as the continuation of a long lineage of leaders 
of the Islamic ummah and aspires to have the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims view them as 
such.9 Moreover, Indonesia hosts the world’s largest Muslim population, whose citizens 
provide significant economic dividends to the Saudi regime through both migrant labor 
and religious tourism. While Western foreign policy over the last century has been 
intimately intertwined with the Muslim world, the shift of U.S. focus from the Middle East 
 
8 Galal Fakkar, “Story behind the King’s Title,” Arab News, January 27, 2015, 
https://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/695351. 
9 David Rundell, Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
2021), 35; Michael Lipka, “Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and around the World,” Pew 
Research Center (blog), August 9, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-
islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/. 
4 
to the Indo-Pacific will not mark Washington’s departure from the Muslim world, merely 
deeper engagement with different aspect of it. Washington’s changing focus is already 
being felt in the region. According to The Economist, “people across South-East Asia 
already see America and China as two poles, pulling their countries in opposite 
directions.”10 It is therefore critical that western policymakers carry forward into Asian 
security policy the hard-earned wisdom collected from decades of policy missteps in the 
Middle East. 
Second, Southeast Asia is a region of immense strategic value and economic 
potential, especially to Beijing. Indonesia and Malaysia are located immediately along the 
Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, making Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur key players 
in both Asia and the world’s economic future—especially in the realm of energy security. 
The entire region’s economies together constitute the fourth largest in the world when 
adjusted for the cost of living, surpassed only by China, India, and the United States.11 
Malaysian and Indonesian economies have been growing by 5–6% over the last decade, 
making the region alluring to Arab states whose secure futures rely on diversified 
economies and broader market accesses.12  
Third, the future unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is important to U.S. 
policy goals in the Middle East. Threats to its cohesion will directly impact the success of 
the American initiatives to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or contain Iran’s 
aggressive regional behavior. Understanding and dissecting the causes and consequences 
of inter-Arab competition both inside the GCC and on its periphery can help policymakers 
better understand the stability and coherence this regional alliance.13  
Finally, as Harry Verhoeven aptly points out, scholarship on transregional national 
security issues is vital to facilitate the reduction of the cognitive barriers that manifest 
 
10 “The Battle for China’s Backyard,” The Economist, February 27, 2021, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/02/27/the-rivalry-between-america-and-china-will-hinge-on-
south-east-asia, para. 2. 
11 The Economist. 
12 The Economist. 
13 Jeffrey Martini et al., “The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation,” RAND Corporation, July 26, 
2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1429.html. 
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inside governments when defense departments, intelligence services, combatant 
commands, or research institutions delineate regional affairs bureaus along neat categories 
like “Middle East” and “Asia,” inadvertently obstructing the understanding of region-to-
region interactions, and impeding a “nuanced [transregional] analysis of the growing 
importance of states in both regions to each other’s security” thereby contributing to the 
“uncertainty and lack of understanding that is proving so hazardous at this moment in 
time.”14 This paper will begin with a concise review of literature of both theories and 
analytical frameworks pertinent to the concept of inter-regional security studies as they 
relate to the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. It will also provide a summary of historic 
relations between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on 
relations between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Indonesia. Gaps in literature will be identified, 
especially related to contemporary research on inter-Arab competition in Southeast Asia, 
making this research especially pertinent to today’s discourse. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the literature on the extent of geopolitical and economic ties between Asia 
and the Middle East is growing, contemporary studies of inter-Arab competition in 
Southeast Asia are largely missing. This is not attributed to the irrelevance of the topic. As 
Christopher Davidson argues, “the rapidly tightening economic interdependence between 
[the Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia] is a recent phenomena [sic] that deserves considerable 
attention.”15 A relevant study of inter-Arab conflict in Southeast Asia must cover three 
categories: mainstream theories of international relations relating to the structure of 
international and regional security; contemporary research on inter-Arab cooperation and 
competition; and a survey of the Persian Gulf’s historic and expanding ties to Southeast 
Asia. This literature review will therefore be organized along these lines. 
 
14 Harry Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and 
Competing Visions of Regional Order,” Civil Wars 20, no. 3 (June 12, 2018): 333–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1483125. 
15 Christopher M. Davidson, The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to 
Interdependence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1. 
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1. The Structure of International and Regional Security 
Traditional explanations of state behavior in the modern Middle East tend to favor 
realist arguments. Classical realism focuses on self-interested states that seek to survive in 
an anarchic global system. Structural realists add concepts such as the relative and absolute 
differences in material capabilities between states, the polarity of the global system, and its 
balance-of-power.16 In terms of cooperation and competition, structural theories of 
international relations argue that the structure of the international system determines state 
behavior via the changing of incentives, and therefore determines whether or not states are 
likely to engage in competitive or cooperative behavior with one another. While these two 
schools of thought are straightforward lenses through which to view changes in hard power 
capabilities as they relate to state insecurity, they tend to fall short in helping us understand 
how shared identities across regions affect other states’ perceptions of security and 
insecurity, or how the “ideas” of a particular nation’s security interests change over time. 
Additionally, while realist theories are straightforward in their application at the system 
level of analysis, they become increasingly unwieldly at the regional level and below. Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver’s theory of regional security complexes merges some of the 
fundamental principles of realism with modern constructivist principles in order to create 
an analytical framework to explain changing patterns of security behaviors across multiple 
levels of analysis.17 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) emerged in the late eighties from the 
“Copenhagen School” of thought in international relations as a direct challenger to 
structural realism because of its emphasis on non-military aspects of power.18 The theory 
rests on the principle that because “most threats travel more easily over short distances than 
over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based 
 
16 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc., 2001). 
17 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=221064. 
18 Bill McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of 
International Studies 22, no. 1 (1996): 81–93. 
7 
clusters” known as security complexes. The natural result of this principle is that since the 
end of the Cold War, the “regional level of security has become both more autonomous 
and more prominent in international politics.”19 While RSCT rests within the constructivist 
camp, it carries forward elements of structural realism such as anarchy and polarity, while 
choosing instead to focus on regional security complexes (RSC) instead of the international 
system as the primary level of analysis. These regional complexes are defined by “durable 
patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent 
patterns of security interdependence.”20 Also emerging from this school of thought is the 
idea that certain international security problems were constructed by actors within the 
system, rather than being intrinsic to it, outlined by a process called “securitization.”21 
While Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde’s 1998 book Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis provides a rigorous framework for understanding and applying 
the theory of “securitization” to practical problems, Buzan and Wæver’s 2003 work 
Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security better incorporates non-state 
actors into the theory while also providing a matrix of analysis for area studies researchers 
to apply RSCT both within and across regions. Its applicability in assessing inter-Arab 
competition has two primary benefits. First, RSCT provides a theoretical and analytical 
framework to guide our research on the behaviors of states within and between regions 
across multiple levels of analysis. Second, it provides a basis to understand and describe 
the behavior of states in both hard power and soft power terms. As explored in the next 
section, these two factors are crucial to understand how and when Gulf Arab states choose 
to cooperate or compete with one another in the Persian Gulf and their periphery. 
2. Contemporary Research on Arab Cooperation and Competition 
When do Arab states choose to cooperate with one another and when do they 
choose to compete against each other? Attempts to answer this question have focused either 
 
19 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 3. 
20 Buzan and Wæver, 45. 
21 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1998), 23. 
8 
on a hermeneutic approach that seeks to understand state behavior through the motives and 
actions of individuals and bureaucracies central to formulating Saudi or Qatari foreign 
policy, or the structural approach of trying to explain the behavior of states based on the 
rules, actions, and incentives present in international and regional systems.22 Falling across 
both categories, research on the changing security structures in the Persian Gulf helps 
partially answer this question, with a considerable amount of contemporary research 
coming from the Copenhagen School. The focus on this subject has grown significantly 
since 2001 on account of the explanatory power that securitization and RSCT have 
displayed in illuminating the causes and consequences of state behavior on both sides of 
the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. 
a. The “Securitization” of the Persian Gulf 
Henner Fürtig first argued that the indefinite U.S. occupation of Iraq had altered the 
region’s polarity, rendering obsolete any previous security structures and transforming the 
Persian Gulf into a triad of U.S., Saudi/GCC, and Iranian power.23 This unbalanced 
triangle creates conditions for cooperation within the GCC vis-à-vis Iran, and between the 
GCC and U.S. In a similar approach, F. Gregory Gause, III also argued the Persian Gulf is 
a regional security complex that is entirely distinct from the patterns of the Levant, despite 
the tendency of observers to lump the adjacent regions together.24 Kristian Ulrichsen 
merges RSCT with emerging perspectives of human security in a bid to understand how 
the “post-oil era” will affect regime security and survival as gulf states seek to transition 
their economies away from oil.25 Ulrichsen follows-up this research with additional 
scholarship on the changing security dynamics of the Persian Gulf, arguing that the 
emergence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, major economic structural 
 
22 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 214. 
23 Henner Fürtig, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and U.S. 
Policy,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (2007): 627–40. 
24 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 5. 
25 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil 
Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 15. 
9 
reforms in petro-states, and Iran’s reengagement with the international community has 
militarized the GCC, adding “new sources of instability into the regional security 
architecture,” potentially changing the way gulf states view their core survival interests.26 
Talal Mohammed Al-Khalifa agrees. In his 2012 dissertation at the University of Exeter 
focusing on a comparative study of the regional security complexes of the Persian Gulf and 
Southeast Asia, Al-Khalifa argues that the GCC emerged as a partial response to the 
region’s security patterns, but also serves as a securitizing actor in the region.27 Research 
papers by Jianwei Han and Hassan Hakiaman, as well as Fatemeh Shayan have also applied 
RSCT to the region, focusing instead on Iranian perceptions of insecurity and its 
implications for the GCC.28 While a study by the RAND Corporation argues that GCC 
cohesion varies over time but that intra-GCC cooperation is likely to continue into the near 
future, small states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have often pursued interests 
independent of the GCC due to fears of Saudi hegemony and memories of Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990.29 While Fürtig argued that the Persian Gulf’s security balance is a triad 
among the U.S., Iran, and the GCC, the evidence seems to indicate that there is a significant 
degree of competition already occurring within the GCC as well. 
b. “Securitization” and Competition Outside of the Persian Gulf 
What about inter-Arab cooperation and competition beyond the Arabian Peninsula? 
The evidence of this phenomenon seems to be growing. Harry Verhoeven has examined 
the growing involvement of Gulf Arab states in the Horn of Africa. He finds their actions 
are driven only partly by shared opposition to Iran’s presence in the region. By applying 
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RSCT to the Gulf Arab states, he demonstrates that structural factors are driving them to 
engage in a zero-sum competition for power and influence in the Horn of Africa in order 
to enhance their own prospects for survival.30 This research was expanded upon by 
William Todman (2018), Jos Meester (2018), and Gerald Feierstein (2020), providing 
thorough cases focusing directly on zero-sum competition between Arab states in East 
Africa, as well as a nuanced explanation of the various types of economic, political, and 
military power being wielded to shape geopolitical outcomes.31  
The guiding principle that seems to emerge from these studies, central to this thesis, 
is that domestic threat perceptions drive Arab states towards cooperation or competition in 
their foreign policies. Jos Meester, Willem van den Berg, and Harry Verhoeven’s 2018 
report titled “Riyal Politik: The political economy of Gulf investments in the Horn of 
Africa” identifies two geopolitical trends which determine the nature of Arab engagement 
with the Horn of Africa: Riyadh’s threat perception of Iran, and enmity among Arab 
states.32 While Iran’s Islamic Revolution is forty-two years old, Riyadh is still “convinced 
that Iran seeks to undermine the stability of the Gulf and encircle Saudi Arabia with Shia 
(or at least pro-Iranian) regimes in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.”33 Whether 
it is joint Saudi-Kuwaiti funding of Salafists in Indonesia in the 1980s to counter creeping 
Iranian influence in Southeast Asia, or inter-GCC military operations launched from 
Eritrea’s port of Assab into Yemen over the last five years, this age-old rivalry has seemed 
to unite Gulf Arab interests in the pursuit of policies both inside and outside the Persian 
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Gulf region.34 Indeed, the encroachment of “external” ideologies which seem to threaten 
the foundation of Arab monarchies has always led to this policy outcome. For example, in 
the 1970s, Arab states established an informal intelligence alliance known as the “Safari 
Club” that sought to counter the spread of communism in Africa. According to William 
Todman, “Saudi Arabia perceived communism as a potential military and ideological 
threat, being especially alarmed by Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia and 
the spread of Marxist liberation movements more broadly.”35 
Conversely, inter-GCC enmity has often pushed Arab states’ interests to diverge. 
When focusing on small states like Qatar or the UAE, there exists an additional fear of 
these states becoming too dependent on Riyadh for their protection because of the leverage 
that Saudi Arabia could exert on their domestic and foreign policies. Even worse, if these 
states are left without other external security guarantors besides Saudi Arabia, they risk 
potentially repeating the same mistake that led to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.36 This 
enmity has led directly to competition among Arab states, either to reduce their reliance on 
Saudi benevolence, or to offer an alternative vision of regional stability. The former is 
highlighted by Qatar’s pursuit of independent food supplies in East Africa.37 The latter is 
exemplified by the UAE’s efforts to achieve “strategic parity with Riyadh and a geo-
economic dominance of the Western Indian Ocean.”38 Thus, Gulf Arab domestic concerns 
about their survival, the likelihood of overlapping or competing interests with their 
neighbors, and how this manifests in their policies in East Africa as highlighted in these 
texts will guide this thesis’ research in Southeast Asia. 
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c. Internal Transformation of the Persian Gulf Regional Security 
Subcomplex 
While the Middle East may still be classified as a standard regional security 
complex, over the last decade (and most notably since 2018) there has been significant 
ongoing internal transformation in the character of the Persian Gulf regional security 
subcomplex. These include of changes in the polarity of the region, changes in patterns 
amity and enmity, and changes in the role of global powers in the Persian Gulf. While the 
analyses provided by Gause, Ulrichsen, Meester, and Verhoeven guide our approach 
towards understanding the durable patterns of security behavior across the Middle East, 
there have been several major changes in the essential nature of the Persian Gulf sub-
complex since 2018 that may alter the domestic threat perceptions of Gulf Arab states and 
thus are to understanding emergent Arab foreign policies today. 
(1) Balance of Power 
In terms of the balance of power across the Middle East, Curtis R. Ryan argues that 
while the region’s alliance politics since the Arab Spring have been dominated by the 
Saudi-Iran rivalry, the intensity of this rivalry has not generated a bipolar, “hostile but 
stable” alliance system.39 In fact, Ryan reasons that the Middle East region has largely 
underbalanced, and that “despite Saudi attempts to rally much of the region against Iran as 
a longtime adversary,” Middle East politics continued to be characterized by a missing 
balance of power and no coherent counter-coalition to Iran.40 Moreover, as of 2020, the 
region has been characterized by patterns that suggest a multi-polar regional alignment 
instead, however there is still a “distinct lack of a [durable] balance of power,” with 
alliances continuing to adjust based on highly volatile domestic and regional challenges 
which suggests a continued “lengthy period of domestic and regional instability for the 
region.”41 Unaccounted for in Ryan’s analysis is also the emergence of Turkey as a 
possible contender for regional hegemony who, since 2015, has expanded its reliance on 
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hard power and direct military intervention in the region in order to secure its interests.42 
In addition to maintaining a military presence in Somalia, Afghanistan, and a military base 
in Qatar, Turkey has also engaged in direct military operations in Syria from 2016–2020, 
in Libya in 2020, expanded its operations against Kurdish PKK forces in northern Iraq, and 
has increased its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to increase its 
leverage for securing potential energy resources against Greek, French, and Egyptian 
claimants.43 
(2) Changes in Patterns of Gulf Arab Amity and Enmity 
Changes in patterns of amity and enmity across the wider Middle East have also 
been tied to changes in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf in the last few years. 
Overlapping security interests between Gulf Arab monarchies and Israel that emerged 
during the Arab Spring, including mutually-perceived threats of Iranian expansion across 
the region and direct military support to Hamas and Hezbollah, have contributed directly 
to the recent bout of normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
Sudan, and Morocco, alleviating a critical source of regional enmity between Israel and 
Arab powers.44 No explicit normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia will 
occur anytime soon, however. Riyadh is burdened both by its leadership role across the 
Arab world and by historic precedent, having led the drafting of the 2002 Arab Peace 
Initiative which offers Arab normalization with Israel in exchange for the establishment of 
a Palestinian state, and by the declaration of the late King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 
who said that “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be the last Muslim country to recognize 
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the state of Israel!”45 Most recently, Nawaf Obeid, a former advisor to the Saudi 
government, said in a May 2021 editorial published in the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds 
that “Saudi recognition [of Israel] (if it occurs) will be conditional on the Palestinians 
obtaining a fully sovereign state.”46 However, signs of diminishing Saudi enmity towards 
Israel are evident, beginning in 2018 with a historic flight by Air India from India to Israel 
that traversed Saudi airspace (a historic first), as well as the 2020 announcement that flights 
between the UAE and Israel will also be permitted to fly over the Kingdom.47 Additionally, 
in early January 2021, days before the inauguration of President Joseph Biden in the United 
States, Saudi Arabia called off its four-year old blockade of Qatar, thus removing a major 
source of inter-Arab enmity, while not fully healing the rift that led to the blockade in the 
first place.48 These changes both decrease durable patterns of inter-Arab enmity that have 
plagued the Persian Gulf’s regional security subcomplex over the last decade while also 
decreasing perceptions of Gulf Arab insecurity in relation to Israel—portending a 
potentially significant structural evolution of the region’s security patterns and ultimately 
its balance of power. 
(3) The Role of Global Powers in the Persian Gulf 
Global power penetration into regional security complexes is a critical mechanism 
that links local and regional dynamics with global ones.49 As regional powers begin to 
make security alignments with both superpowers and great powers in order to secure their 
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own survival, patterns of security within a regional security complex can begin to take on 
the characteristics of global power rivalries. While the U.S.-USSR Cold War did indeed 
split the Arab world into “pro-U.S.” and “pro-USSR” blocs, this pattern largely 
disappeared at the end of the Cold War. The last decade, however, has shown an increase 
in global power penetration of the Persian Gulf regional security subcomplex—a region 
previously monopolized by the United States. Russia, seeking to blunt U.S. hegemony over 
the Middle East and frustrate U.S. policy objectives, intervened in Syria in 2015 in order 
to prop up the weakening government of Bashar al-Assad.50 Chinese military forces do 
have an increasing presence in the Middle East too, however it is generally limited to the 
presence of peacekeeping forces, maritime escort fleets in the Gulf of Aden, naval technical 
service stops in regional ports, and military exercises with Iran as recent as last February.51 
In March 2021, China and Iran also concluded a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
(Iran’s first such agreement with a global power), which covers a wide variety of economic, 
transportation, and agricultural activities.52 Such an agreement, coming under the shadow 
of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), increases speculation that China may only 
continue to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf in the years to come, making it a more 
central political player in the region’s security dynamics. Lastly, it’s worth mentioning that 
this uptick in Russian and Chinese involvement in the Middle East comes at a time when 
President Biden has reduced the priority of U.S. policy in the Middle East and has fully 
withdrawn U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan, potentially prompting U.S. partners like 
Saudi Arabia to continue to hedge against, and reduce their reliance on, a long-term U.S.-
led security umbrella.53 
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3. Historic and Emerging Connectivity between the Persian Gulf and
Southeast Asia
Still missing from contemporary scholarly literature is direct research into inter-
Arab competition in Southeast Asia. While the historical ties between the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia suggest that there is potential for the region to become an arena of 
competing Gulf Arab interests, the slim literature in this field generally falls into two 
camps: traditional explorations of inter-regional competition for influence in Southeast 
Asia (relating to Saudi-Iranian religiopolitical competition for hegemony in the Islamic 
world between 1960 and 2001), or contemporary research of expanding political, 
economic, and social ties between the Middle East and Asia related to the rapid growth of 
Asian economies, the emergence of China and other Asian “great powers,” or the potential 
reduction of U.S. security commitments to the Persian Gulf.  
Fred R. von der Mehden provides an excellent synopsis of the political, economic, 
and intellectual ties between the Middle East and Southeast Asia since 1945, to include the 
impact of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution on the region.54 Kim Ghattas’ book Black Wave 
provides an exceptional overview of the rigid, ideological competition between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony that has dominated regional politics since 1979. 
This competition, while still occurring today, had a significant impact on the society and 
politics of Southeast Asia due in large part to the influx of Saudi and Iranian money and 
ideology to the region. The extensive religiopolitical infrastructure that Saudi Arabia 
created in order to cultivate and wield its influence across the Islamic world, and in 
Indonesia, is outlined in Krithika Varagur’s The Call: Inside the Saudi Global Religious 
Project.55 Other similar works provide broad historical overviews of the ties between the 
two regions, targeted analyses of Saudi-Indonesian relations, or more anecdotal evidence 
54 von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 64. 
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of inter-regional competition related to religion or political influence.56 Two major works 
in this field of study are worth mentioning because they provide a thorough empirical 
foundation for assessing the expanding relationships between the Middle East and Asia. 
The first is a project published by the Asia Society Policy Institute titled “Asia’s New Pivot: 
Evolving Ties Between Asia and the Middle East” which offers a sweeping and well-
resourced set of case studies highlighting the growing economic, diplomatic, defense, and 
societal ties between China, India, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (missing from their research is a case study on Qatar).57 Similar to Arab political 
and economic intervention in East Africa, this study highlights similar key behaviors we 
expect Arab states to engage in in the event ties to the region became securitized. The 
second is Emma Sobrier’s 2020 publication titled “Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: 
Power Competition, Diversified Cooperation” that discusses the increasing diversification 
of Gulf countries’ external partnerships, especially in the realm of defense and security 
cooperation, including an assessment on the “changing underlying power strategies of the 
Gulf states.”58 While these studies are thorough, the research gap on a methodologically-
grounded assessment of inter-Arab competition in Southeast Asia remains. 
4. Conclusion 
The preceding literature review explored three major themes related to the 
understanding of inter-Arab competition in Southeast Asia: the mainstream theories of 
international relations that relate to the structure of international and regional security; 
contemporary research on inter-Arab cooperation and competition both inside the Persian 
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Gulf as well as outside of it; and a survey of the Persian Gulf’s historic and its growing ties 
to Southeast Asia. This literature review has explored a body of scholarship on 
international relations and regional studies applicable to exploring the topic of inter-Arab 
competition. It has also identified relevant scholarship on related topics, such as the 
“securitization” of the Persian Gulf, its influence on both Arab cooperation and competition 
in adjacent regions, and expanding modes of connectivity between the Arab world and 
Southeast Asia. However, the research gap on inter-Arab competition in Southeast Asia 
remains. As the interconnectivity between the Arab world and Southeast Asia will only 
continue to accelerate, the relevance of this research will only increase, making this thesis 
increasingly relevant to today’s pressing questions in the realm of international security 
affairs. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Through the analytical framework provided by RSCT and the concepts of 
“securitization” as defined by Buzan and Wæver, this thesis seeks to determine whether or 
not Southeast Asia is emerging either as a “competitive” or “cooperative” environment of 
geopolitical engagement between Gulf Arab states by identifying (or eliminating) the 
presence of conditions that seem to be driving inter-Arab competition in other regions of 
the world. These conditions, directly related to domestic threat perceptions and political 
cleavages of Gulf Arab states, are: the manifestations of collective threats to the GCC (such 
as the Saudi-Iranian proxy war), which suggests that inter-Arab cooperation is more likely; 
and the extension and degree of Gulf Arab enmity into the region.59 See the depiction of 
our analytical framework in Figure 1 for more detail. 
An example of this in recent history is the question over the composition of Egypt’s 
government after the Arab Spring. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar cared deeply about the 
post-revolutionary nature of Egypt’s government after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, 
but both states pursued different strategies with conflicting objectives. While Doha had 
thrown its lot in with the Muslim Brotherhood in an effort to gain influence with what it 
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saw as an emerging regional trend, Saudi Arabia saw the Muslim Brotherhood as an 
existential threat and led the counterrevolution that re-imposed Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s 
military dictatorship in Cairo.60 In this case, the Saudi-Iran proxy conflict did not pose a 
significant threat because of the Sunni composition of Egyptian society, therefore a 
significant external threat to the GCC did not exist. However, enmity between Gulf Arab 
states did manifest enormously. From Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s perspective, the rise of 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood presented an existential ideological threat to the ideology 
that their kingdoms are founded on.61 To Doha, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
represented the potential beginning of a new wave of political Islam hitting the Middle 
East, and Qatar sought to invest early in this trend in order to curry favor within this 
movement and as a means of hedging against growing Saudi power.62 
1. H1: Gulf Arab Interaction is Competitive 
If inter-Arab engagement with Southeast Asia is competitive, then based on the 
empirical evidence cited previously, we are likely to see conditions that minimize 
collective threats to the GCC and maximize the political cleavages (e.g., enmity) between 
Gulf Arab states. This suggests that either manifestations of collective threats to the GCC 
are not present in Southeast Asia, or at a minimum is outweighed by drivers of enmity 
between Gulf Arab states. An example of this may be Qatar’s participation in the 2019 
Kuala Lumpur Summit. While Iran was present at this summit, the Saudi-Iran competition 
for influence in Southeast Asia seems to have been reduced since its peak after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. Additionally, while the Saudis viewed this summit “as an aspiring rival 
to the Organisation [sic] of Islamic Cooperation” which threatens their religious hegemony 
over the Muslim world, Qatar seems to have viewed this summit as an opportunity to 
continue its strategy of hedging its external support against Riyadh.63 
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2. H2: Gulf Arab Interaction is Cooperative 
If inter-Arab engagement with Southeast Asia is cooperative, then based on the 
previous evidence, we are likely to see conditions that either maximize the collective 
perceived threats towards the GCC, or minimize enmity between Gulf Arab states. An 
example of this is the GCC’s efforts to contain Iranian influence in East Africa, which has 
presented an emerging Iranian threat to the GCC along a new flank of the Arabian 
Peninsula because it would increase Iranian leverage against the Bab al-Mandeb maritime 
strait and thus against the GCC. This culminated with Sudan and Eritrea’s ejection of 
Iranian diplomats in 2014 and discussions in 2019 between Arab and East African states 
about forming a “Red Sea security alliance” among themselves. Here, the reduction of 
Iranian pressure on the western edge of the Arabian Peninsula provides a positive security 
gain for all GCC states.64 
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Figure 1. Analytical Framework 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be comprised of a comparative case study of Saudi Arabian and 
Qatari foreign policy towards Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to examine the nature 
and intensity of Saudi and Qatari political, military, social, and economic ties to Indonesia 
since the 1990s in order to identify significant trends or changes that may determine 
whether or not Southeast Asia is emerging as a zone of inter-Arab competition. Due to 
limitations in resources and time, this paper does not seek to directly affirm causality to 
what is driving strategic changes in the nature of Gulf Arab foreign policy, but does seek 
to identify potential causes as opportunities for future research. 
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia were both selected because of their roles as rising or 
established regional powers in their particular regional security complexes, while Qatar 
was selected due to its contemporary role as an independent challenger to Saudi hegemony 
both in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East. These states in particular are most likely 
to act as bellwethers to help identify emerging transregional trends. In order to test these 
hypotheses, special attention will be paid to bilateral engagements or unique agreements 
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between parties that either bar access to other states or state-affiliated entities, or where the 
benefits of an agreement overwhelmingly favor one actor over another, suggesting that the 
nature of engagements are either zero-sum, exploitative, and therefore potentially 
competitive, or positive-sum and potentially benign or cooperative. Similarly, multilateral 
agreements or engagements through intergovernmental organizations that produce 
positive-sum benefits that are not explicitly exclusionary support the case against inter-
Arab competition. 
To substantiate the concluding assessment, I will draw on a range of primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources will include foreign government websites, statements, 
interviews, and propaganda, as well as social media and other relevant resources from both 
Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian outlets. These sources will offer the most nuanced 
understanding of the nature and intent of inter-state agreements, however our access to 
certain types of agreements may be limited. Therefore, this research will also rely on 
appropriate secondary sources, to include official government reports, reports from inter-
governmental (IGO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), journal articles, 
interviews, and books covering relevant topics which may shed light on the nature and 
intent of emerging policies. This research will be limited to works in or translated to 
English, Arabic, and Indonesian. 
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II. SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA 
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to answer the question of whether or not Southeast Asia is emerging as a 
zone of competition between Gulf Arab states, we must first understand what generally 
causes intra-Arab cooperation or competition. While our review of the literature suggests 
that two critical variables are the presence and intensity of collective threats to GCC 
member states as well as the presence and intensity of intra-Arab cleavages, we must 
understand in more detail Saudi and Qatari domestic vulnerabilities, their subsequent threat 
perceptions, and linkages between domestic security interests and Southeast Asia. Such an 
understanding will help us identify specific cases where Saudi and Qatari interests may 
overlap, potentially providing an avenue for cooperation in their policies abroad as well as 
help identify areas where their interests diverge, providing potential indications of areas 
where Doha and Riyadh may compete if their core interests are threatened. We will then 
use these indicators as criteria for assessing the foreign policies pursued by, in this case, 
Saudi Arabia in order to assess whether or not intra-Arab competition in Southeast Asia is 
an emerging phenomenon. 
Building on previous research of the structure of security and balance of power in 
the Persian Gulf, this case study will use the descriptive area studies framework provided 
by Buzan and Wæver to examine Saudi Arabia’s domestically-generated vulnerabilities, 
state-to-state relations, inter-regional interactions, and the shifting role of global powers in 
the Persian Gulf in order to answer the question of whether or not Southeast Asia is 
emerging as a zone of inter-Arab competition. This chapter will begin with an investigation 
into state-level, domestically-generated vulnerabilities, threat perceptions, and linkages 
between these Saudi threats and subsequent foreign policies towards Indonesia.65 This 
work will provide critical data to later assist in our concluding analysis of the regional 
security patterns of the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia in order to identify conditions that 
incentivize Gulf Arab cooperation or competition.  
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B. SAUDI-INDONESIAN RELATIONS FROM 1948–1990 
While ties between the Arabian Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago can be 
traced back to the period between 1000 and 1600, characterized by the growth of both 
religious migration from Southeast Asia to Mecca as well as the movement of Arab traders 
to Southeast Asia. Formal relations between the modern Saudi state and the government of 
Indonesia were not established until 1948, when a newly independent Indonesia first 
opened its embassy in Jeddah.66 Formal visits between heads of state have been rare. 
Indonesian President Sukarno and King Saud Abdulaziz Al Saud first met in 1955 while 
Sukarno was on hajj, and that same year Prince Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz visited Jakarta while 
attending the Bandung Conference in Indonesia.67 King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz later made 
his first formal state visit to Jakarta in 1970 to visit President Suharto.68 A Saudi king 
would not again visit Indonesia until King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 2017 trip to 
Jakarta.69 
International relations between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been marked by 
varying degrees of intensity, with the strongest ties taking place during periods of mutual 
insecurity shared by both Saudi and Indonesian rulers. According to Sumanto Al Qurtuby, 
in the 1950s and 1960s Saudi Arabia tried to forge a closer alliance with Indonesia in order 
to counteract the spread of socialism and communism across the Middle East and wider 
Muslim world, yet during Indonesia’s Old Order, President Sukarno was unenthusiastic 
about such an alignment given his affinity for socialism.70 In 1961, Saudi Arabia and 
 
66 von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 2; “Saudi Relations with Indonesia,” The Embassy of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Republic of Indonesia, accessed July 20, 2021, 
https://embassies.mofa.gov.sa/sites/indonesia/AR/AboutHostingCountry/SaudiRelations/Pages/default.aspx
. 
67 Zachary Karabell, “Bandung Conference,” Encyclopedia.com, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/asia-and-africa/southeast-asia-history/bandung-conference; “King 
Salman Chats with Sukarno’s Granddaughter Puan Maharani,” The Jakarta Post, March 2, 2017, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/02/king-salman-chats-with-sukarnos-granddaughter-puan-
maharani.html. 
68 “Saudi King Visits Indonesia with ‘Cars and Entourage,’” BBC News, March 1, 2017, sec. Asia, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39099988. 
69 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “Saudi Relations with Indonesia.” 
70 Al Qurtuby, Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Networks, 28. 
25 
Indonesia both joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in an effort to remain neutral as 
the bipolar, U.S.-Soviet rivalry began to sway regional alignments too, however bilateral 
relations between these two states remained weak.71 In 1963, Indonesian police raided the 
residence of the Saudi ambassador Mohammed Abd Al-Qadr Muhtasib, purportedly 
without explanation, leading to his departure of the country until relations could be repaired 
in 1967 by Mohammad Natsir.72 
While Sukarno was generally uninterested in pursuing stronger ties with Saudi 
Arabia in the 1960s, Riyadh was certainly interested in increasing its influence in Indonesia 
through Islamic proselytization (dawa) and the spread of Salafism. In 1962, King Faisal 
established the Muslim World League (MWL) as the first of many state bureaucracies 
designed to help Saudi Arabia export its religious influence globally. In 1967, Natsir helped 
found the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in Indonesia, a dawa council that  
served as “the chief conduit for [feeding] Saudi money into Indonesia.”73 Saudi Arabia 
again expanded its religiopolitical institutions in 1972 with the creation of both the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), of which Indonesia is a member, as well as the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).74 Only after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in 
Iran, when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Tehran on a wave of expansionist, Shia 
revolutionary fervor did Indonesia’s new President Suharto feel threatened and thus align 
Saudi and Indonesian interests in checking the spread of Islamism.75 Paradoxically, due to 
the influx of Saudi petrodollars into Indonesia during this period and the related influence 
that the rising tide of Islamization globally was having on the domestic political fabric of 
Southeast Asia, President Suharto both embraced domestic Islamic political groups more 
closely than ever (at the cost of his Christian allies) in order to secure his political base, 
while also increasing state control over “those Islamic forces seen is detrimental to state 
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policies,” which included the influx of Saudi money.76 During the 1980s and 1990s, formal 
ties between Riyadh and Jakarta stalled, with few major bilateral compacts signed between 
one another, yet informal ties between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia strengthened, focusing 
largely on religion and migrant labor.77  
C. INDICATORS FOR POTENTIAL COOPERATION OR COMPETITION 
1. Saudi Arabia’s Domestic Vulnerabilities and Threat Perceptions 
As argued by Verhoeven, the Persian Gulf regional security complex is dominated 
by the “politics of state survival and regime survival,” with states internal to it facing an 
ever-present reality of state formation and decay where “the redrawing of borders is not 
just hypothetical but an empirical reality experienced in the recent past.”78 Domestic 
security concerns of Gulf Arab regimes are linked directly to their foreign policies through 
“omnibalancing” strategies that seek to neutralize domestic threats by way of international 
assistance while also playing those external powers against one another.79 However, when 
discussing threats to Gulf Arab national security, early debates about the definition of 
security rightly ask: “security for whom?”80 In this case, our dominant referent object—
the entity seen to be existentially threatened that has a legitimate claim to survival—is the 
Saudi state, which can mean both the survival and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia as a political 
institution, as well as the legitimacy and stability of the Al Saud monarchy, to include 
individual leaders like King Salman or his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al 
Saud.81 For Verhoeven describes this linkage between domestic and foreign policy 
interests as the “tendency of elites to see the success of their regional ambitions as 
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intimately linked to their ability to hold onto power domestically.”82 For simplicity’s sake, 
we will refer to all of these as the “Saudi state,” unless otherwise noted. What then are 
Saudi Arabia’s domestic vulnerabilities and threat perceptions? And what linkages exist 
between these and Southeast Asia, if any? 
a. Political 
Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil, once its most powerful asset, now serves as the 
Kingdom’s Achilles heel, rendering one of the world’s few remaining absolute monarchies 
vulnerable to a variety of endogenous and exogenous threats. In the framework of 
securitization, the political vulnerabilities of the Saudi state, as well as their complementary 
threats, refer to those phenomena that undermine the sovereign Saudi state and the Al Saud 
monarchy that sits atop it, to include what Buzan calls the state’s constituent components: 
its ideas, physical base, and institutions.83 Saudi Arabia’s composition as a Salafi, 
hereditary monarchy renders the Kingdom vulnerable to ideological challengers who 
question both the Kingdom’s religious credentials as well as the philosophy underpinning 
its style of government. Domestically, the Al Saud royal family relies on the religious 
legitimacy bestowed upon them by the state’s clerical class—an agreement that dates all 
the way back to the founding of the country.84 The Saudi monarchy also faces challenges 
from external actors like Iran and Turkey, who, in addition to Riyadh, seek regional 
hegemony and see religion as an avenue to compete against Saudi influence.85 There is 
little doubt that Saudi Arabia’s spread of Wahhabism over the last few decades, one of 
Islam’s most puritanical schools of thought, has left the Kingdom vulnerable to criticism 
about its role in the Muslim world. One of several emerging challengers in the realm of 
religious soft power is Indonesia and the Nahdlatul Ulama political party.86 In addition to 
Saudi vulnerabilities related to its Islamic bona fides, the Kingdom also faces challenges 
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from those who oppose the idea of absolute monarchies. While American neoconservatives 
circa 2003 called for the spread of democracy in the Middle East, directly undermining the 
foundation of the Saudi state, more threatening to the Saudi royal family was the outbreak 
of the Arab Spring and the grassroots push for sweeping governmental change across the 
Arab world.87  
Physical challenges to the territorial integrity of the Saudi state include the 
expanding influence of rapidly arming neighbors, ongoing wars on the Kingdom’s borders, 
as well as unresolved border disputes with its neighbors. The war in Yemen against the 
Iran-backed Ansar Allah, commonly referred to as the Houthi movement, is the Kingdom’s 
most threatening conflict to reach Saudi soil, however the swift rise of the Islamic State in 
Iraq following the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 presented leaders in Riyadh with a 
wider regional challenge.88 Riyadh also has several ongoing border disputes with Sunni 
neighbors like Kuwait, Yemen, and the UAE, adding to the cyclical ebb and flow of intra-
GCC relations over the previous years.89 Finally, the most pressing threat to Saudi Arabia’s 
physical security comes from Iran, whose build-up of advanced conventional weapons like 
its ballistic missile program, unmanned weapons systems, and expansion of proxy militias 
across Iraq, Syria, and Yemen increasingly adds to GCC-wide anxiety. Case in point was 
the 2019 Iranian-sponsored attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities that 
took half of the country’s oil production offline.90 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also faces a wide array of challenges to its ruling 
institutions, largely stemming from internal forces. According to former U.S. Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia, David Rundell, the leading challenges are religious intolerance, endemic 
corruption, and questions related to political participation. The modernization efforts 
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pushed by Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 initiative create what Rundell describes 
as a “paradox.”91 He argues that these reforms introduce “significantly disruptive social 
and economic change with the goal of preserving a traditional monarchy, yet it will also 
significantly alter the relationship between the Saudi [citizen] and their government.”92 
Rundell also warns that we are witnessing today in Saudi Arabia the emergence of “the 
same forces that historically led to change in other monarchies,” to include “an end to social 
deference, the decline of religion, and the emergence of the individual.”93 Challenging this 
is institutionalized discrimination in Saudi society against religious minorities, especially 
Shia Muslims, and Riyadh’s failure to “create a society in which the Shia community feels 
fully Saudi.”94 Corruption and rising authoritarianism also threaten to create political 
instability during this period of sweeping reforms. Corruption in Saudi politics was largely 
an accepted practiced, fueled in by oil wealth, as a tool to placate the ever-growing number 
of Saudi royals who could challenge the authority of the monarchy’s ruling cohort.95 Now 
in a period of potential austerity and tightening budgets, corruption threatens not only Saudi 
coffers but also leads to inept governance and diminishing public trust. The securitization 
of this particular issue was apparent after the takeover of Mohammed bin Salman and his 
creation of the Supreme Committee for Combatting Corruption (SCCC).96 Lastly, rising 
authoritarianism, characterized by the marginalization of the Majlis Al-Shura, increasing 
opaqueness of senior Saudi decision-making, increased domestic surveillance, and 
increased repression also threaten the stability of Saudi political institutions and the 
compact between the monarch and the citizen. While Rundell says that the “age-old system 
of individual access to senior leaders for personal matters has unraveled,” he continues to 
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argue that, “for now, Saudis seem willing to trade social liberalization and anticipated 
economic opportunity for greater political participation—but for how long?”97 
(1) Political Linkages to Southeast Asia 
The most obvious linkage between Saudi political vulnerabilities and Southeast 
Asia is a tacit ideological competition taking place between Saudi state Salafism, and the 
“humanitarian, pluralistic notion of Islam” propagated by Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama.98 
While neither NU nor the Al Saud royal family are openly seeking to depose one another, 
both entities are using religious soft power tools in the pursuit of political objectives across 
the Muslim world that have potentially significant domestic consequences. Saudi 
acceleration of proselytization activities both domestically and abroad after 1979 has been 
motivated primarily by a desire to bolster its religious credibility at home following the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca by radical Saudi preacher Juhayman al-
Otaybi and his followers.99 The legitimacy of the Al Saud family as rulers of the Kingdom 
have always been tied to their Islamic credentials as recognized by the Salafi clerical class 
ever since the consolidation of Ibn Saud’s power at the 1928 Riyadh Conference.100 While 
Saudi rulers have since been vigilant of potential internal challenges to their authority, only 
since 1979 have Saudi royals feared the emergence of external challenges to their Islamic 
influence. 
Similarly, Nahdlatul Ulama’s propagation of Indonesia’s “Islam Nusantara”—a 
more moderate and pluralist alternative to Saudi-propagated Wahhabism—is intended to 
undermine the ideology of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The mobilization of 
this ideology, according to general secretary to the NU supreme council Yahya Cholil 
Staquf, is a direct challenge to “the idea of ISIS, which wants Islam to be uniform, meaning 
that if there is any other idea of Islam that is not following their ideas, those people are 
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infidels who must be killed…We will show that is not the case with Islam.”101 The 
problem is that Saudi clerics and ISIS ideologues alike is that they believe that Islam is 
uniform—in direct contrast to Yahya Cholil Staquf. While MBS has begun to restrict the 
influence of Saudi Arabia’s clerical class as he seeks to reform the state’s economic and 
political foundations, the major concern is that the permeation of a “pluralist” and 
“moderate” brand of Islam into Saudi society could upset the delicate balance between the 
Al Saud royal family and deeply conservative clerical class at a time when Saudi leaders 
are still vulnerable to their actions.102 
While Saudi fears of NU’s influence were somewhat assuaged in 2016, according 
to James Dorsey, after Widodo tabled a proposal by NU seeking to expand Indonesia’s 
religious soft power globally due to the damage it would cause to Indonesia’s relations 
with Gulf Arab states, in 2018 during a ceremony kicking off the construction of the 
Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII), Widodo declared that it was it was 
“natural and fitting that Indonesia should become the (authoritative) reference for the 
progress of Islamic civilization.”103 In 2019, Ma’ruf Amin, the former supreme leader of 
NU, became Indonesia’s vice president, and in early 2020, the NU’s growing prominence 
led to the visit of the head of the Saudi-based Muslim World League, Muhammad bin 
Abdul Karim Al-Issa, to NU headquarters in Jakarta, according to Dorsey—the first of its 
kind in the 60-year history of the MWL.104 Al-Issa had purportedly turned down a meeting 
in 2018 with a NU cleric because he “had ‘never heard’ of the Indonesian scholar and could 
not make time ‘due to an extremely previous busy schedule of meetings with international 
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Islamic personalities.’”105 Regardless of recent developments, the potential 
institutionalization of NU as a soft power tool in Indonesia does present an indirect threat 
to Al Saud domestic legitimacy should the Saudi royal family be unable to restrain the 
power of their clerical class.  
b. Economics and Energy 
Economic vulnerabilities and threats overlap significantly with the political threats 
of the Saudi state, making it hard to delineate clearly between purely “political” or 
“economic” threats to the Saudi state. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s economic security is also 
deeply intertwined with its energy security given the role that Saudi oil has historically 
played in the world economy. In defining economic security as a concept, Buzan and 
Wæver, in their 1998 book “Security Analysis: A New Framework,” begin with a 
differentiation between mercantilist, liberal, and socialist perspectives of economies and 
the priority of relationship between the state and the market, i.e., in a mercantilist system, 
the state comes before the market; in a liberal system, the market comes first.106 While one 
could argue that large facets of the Saudi economy are mercantilist, and that King Salman 
and crown prince Mohammed bin Salman are in the process of liberalizing certain aspects 
of the Saudi economy, specific categorization of the nature of the Saudi economy is beyond 
the focus of this paper. More important is the fact that the Saudi economy is highly 
dependent on, and therefore vulnerable to, oil.  
Decades of cheap oil have allowed Saudi leaders to avoid addressing significant 
underlying vulnerabilities in its economy and society writ large. Cheap Saudi oil and high 
population growth has enabled a significant expansion of domestic energy consumption 
relative to Saudi exports, seriously threatening Saudi oil revenues.107 It has also enabled 
Saudi energy use to get away with extremely inefficient use of fossil fuels. According to 
James Russell, Saudi Arabia already uses “an estimated nine times more electricity per 
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capita than its neighbors” with projected domestic oil consumption to triple over the next 
15 years.108 While the World Energy Council’s Energy Trilemma Index gives an A grade 
to Saudi Arabia’s level of energy equity, it also gives it a B for energy security and a D for 
environmental sustainability.109 Water desalinization is a highly expensive and energy-
intensive process but is also critical to water-scarce climates like Saudi Arabia, who, 
according to the U.S.-Saudi Business Council, produces 7.6 million cubic-meters of 
desalinated water per day, amounting to 60% of the Kingdom’s total water supply.110 
Lastly, reliance on oil has significantly distorted the Saudi labor market. Thanks to 
significant revenues beginning in the 1970s, the Saudi labor market largely shifted from 
private to state-sponsored employment underpinned by significant domestic subsidies.111 
By and large, the Saudi economy has been dominated by hydrocarbons and its derivative 
products ever since, and with few linkages to the wider economy, growth and income 
distribution is largely limited to within this industry.112 According to the IMF, since the 
year 2000, in order to fund government spending the Saudi economy has required the 
average price-per-barrel of oil to fall no lower than $80 USD—referred to as the fiscal 
breakeven price.113 However, since 2014, oil prices have plunged well below that 
threshold, sparking fears in Riyadh that the world’s demand for oil has peaked and 
prompting significant initiatives towards internal social and economic reforms.114 While 
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the price of Brent crude in July 2021 sits at $78.20 per barrel, fears over the future 
economic viability of the Saudi state remain.  
(1) Economic Linkages to Southeast Asia 
Linkages between Saudi Arabia and Southeast Asia in the realm of trade and 
economics are  limited but have been growing since the early 2000s following, among 
many things, U.S. efforts to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil and King Abdullah’s 
reaffirmation of the Saudi “Look East” trade policy which sought to “capitalize on the 
ascent of Asia’s major emerging economies.”115 According to Sean Foley, “Asian 
investment, pilgrimages, tourism, and trade—both with [Saudi Arabia] and the region that 
surrounds it—are vital to realizing the goals of Vision 2030.”116 Economic linkages 
between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are especially strong in the realm of foreign labor, 
religious tourism, investments, and energy. Yon Machmudi argues that commercial 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are significant, although Saudi Arabia 
dominates: “Indonesia is highly dependent on petroleum and gas from Saudi Arabia, while 
Indonesia exports commodities such as woods, electronics, tyres [sic], cars, lubricants and 
electrical appliances” to Saudi Arabia.117 
First off, the Saudi economy is highly reliant on foreign labor, with a large portion 
of this coming from South and Southeast Asia. Despite efforts by the government to reduce 
reliance on foreign labor and to increase Saudi participation in the workforce, as of 2020 
over 78% of Saudi Arabia’s workforce was still comprised of non-Saudi citizens, according 
to the Saudi Central Bank.118 According to the United Nations, the total number of 
migrants in Saudi Arabia in 2020 totaled 13,454,842 people, with Indonesia providing the 
second largest share of migrants at 1,709,318 people (or 13% of Saudi Arabia’s total 
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migrant population behind India).119 Indeed, Asian labor in Saudi Arabia has been a 
historic feature of the Kingdom’s economy, thanks in part to deliberate policies put in place 
by Jakarta in the 1990s designed to tackle unemployment amid an economic downturn and 
increasing inflation. According to Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Saudi became the main 
destination for Indonesian workers largely because earnings were substantially higher than 
another possible destination countries in Asia such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brunei 
Darussalam, and Singapore.”120 Conversely, the Indonesian economy has enjoyed the 
receipt of remittances from Indonesians working abroad, which at their peak in 2005 
totaled 1.86% of Indonesia’s GDP.121 Between 1995 and 1999 alone, “remittances from 
Saudi Arabia totaled some 285.3 billion riyals—about US$76 billion” over a four-year 
period, according to Al Qurtuby.122 In 2009, total remittances from Indonesian workers in 
Saudi Arabia totaled $2.2 billion, and in 2018 the value dropped to $984 million.123 These 
ties have not come without controversy, however. While Indonesia provides a significant 
number of foreign workers for the Saudi economy, Jakarta has had a difficult time using 
this as leverage with Riyadh to improve the treatment of Indonesian workers in the 
Kingdom, who are all too often subject to abuse, human trafficking, or arrest and execution. 
The details of this will be discussed later in further detail. 
It is clear that the economic linkages between Saudi Arabia and Asia exist and are 
growing, and that the future economic viability of the Kingdom is directly tied to the 
economies of East and Southeast Asia for the time being, both in terms of seeking market 
share for Saudi fossil fuels, as well as foreign labor. Managing major structural economic 
transformation of the Saudi state while improving bilateral economic cooperation with 
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Southeast Asian states is a monumental challenge for King Salman and MBS, one that is 
no doubt intimately linked to the peaks and troughs of Asian economies. 
c. Environmental 
Saudi Arabia environmental vulnerabilities and threats are numerous, given the fact 
that the Middle East as a region is already recognized as “the most water-stressed 
environment on the planet” and that Saudi Arabia is already experiencing “inexorable 
climate-change trends.”124 In these circumstances, particular threats to Saudi society are 
both endogenous and exogenous to society. Endogenous threats can be population growth, 
migration and urbanization, unequal distribution of scare resources, and depletion of 
resources. Exogenous threats are climate change and related phenomena like temperature 
changes, precipitation changes, sea level rise, desertification, and changes in frequency and 
intensity of ecological disasters such as storms, droughts, and heat waves.125 These threats 
already exacerbate Saudi food and water insecurity. While these threats directly afflict the 
level of development achieved by the Saudi state in its 89 years of existence, Thomas 
Homer-Dixon argues that there is an indirect causal relationship between environmental 
scarcity cause by these phenomena, leading to changes in social and economic activity of 
a society that can weaken states and potentially lead to violent conflict.126 The Saudi 
government, led by King Salman and crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, successfully 
securitized the issue of Saudi environmental security as a component of Vision 2030 
government reforms. One indication of this is the move by the Ministry of Interior in 
August 2020 to established a dedicated environmental security unit known as the Special 
Forces for Environmental Security (SFES).127 According to Brigadier General Saher  
Al-Harbi, the newly appointed commander of the SFES, the duties of this unit are not just 
“limited to protecting wildlife and biodiversity…it penalizes activities that harm the 
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environment such as illegal poaching and logging; prevents air, water and soil pollution; 
and prevents activities that could harm the natural ecosystems of mountainous, land and 
coastal areas.”128 
(1) Environmental Linkages to Southeast Asia 
Linkages between Saudi and Indonesian environmental security issues, if they exist 
at all, are at best indirect. Most strategically, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are both acutely 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, especially as it relates to changing temperate, 
patterns of precipitation, and sea level rise, however national efforts to shore up these 
vulnerabilities do not overlap. Instead, linkages between Riyadh and Jakarta in terms of 
environmental security occur primarily in Saudi efforts to ensure the Kingdom’s food 
security. While Riyadh has been able to meet its water demand needs internally through 
desalinization, meeting the demand for food is a different challenge.129 According to 
Madeleine Lovell, despite only having 2% arable land within its borders, Saudi Arabia is 
food secure because Riyadh’s “economic strength has enabled it to…create trade-based 
food security” through imports and investments.130 Since its failed efforts at achieving 
food self-sufficiency in the 1990s, according to Machmudi, “food security [has been] a 
considerable concern to Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia is included in the Kingdom’s national 
food security strategy.”131 Saudi agricultural imports are not dependent on Indonesia nor 
to Asia, however. According to Chatham House, in 2019 Saudi Arabia’s top five partners 
for importing agricultural products were Brazil, India, the United States, Argentina, and 
the UAE.132  
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While the vulnerabilities and threats outlined in this paper’s section of physical 
threats to Saudi political security are nearly identical, there are additional military-centric 
vulnerabilities that help feed into Saudi insecurities. First and foremost, in line with the 
principle of RSCT that states are primarily concerned about their immediate neighbors 
because “threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones,” Riyadh’s most 
pressing military concerns stem from other large regional rivals who have traditionally 
maintained large, standing armies: Iraq, Iran, and now Turkey.133 Saudi Arabia also faces 
lesser threats from proxy forces trained and equipped by these regional rivals, such as the 
Houthis in Yemen.134 
Other defense vulnerabilities exist, however. For example, since the withdrawal of 
British military forces from the Persian Gulf and the introduction of U.S. military forces in 
the region in the lead up to Operation Desert Storm, the Saudi government has relied on a 
U.S.-enabled security umbrella for protection from regional aggressors, which has also
stymied the development of a lethal, Saudi-led fighting force capable of fighting against a
regional adversary.135 The 2011 announcement of America’s “Pivot to Asia” and the calls
of several U.S. presidential administrations to reduce its military footprint in the gulf has
caused significant anxiety in Arab capitals at the prospect of the possible reduction or
elimination of this security umbrella.136 This policy continued forward in the major
national security documents published by the Trump administration, to include the recently
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declassified U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific.137 While the GCC has 
maintained a semi-integrated military arm since the mid-1990s called the “Peninsula Shield 
Force,” the readiness of this force to operate in unison during a conflict remains 
questionable. To date, the defense of Saudi Arabia relies on both U.S. forces as well as 
U.S.-made weapons and equipment.138 Among the many reforms implemented by 
Mohammed bin Salman since 2016, several focus on developing a domestic arms 
production industry as well as major reforms to the overall structure of the Saudi military, 
however success in these efforts remain stalled due in part to the low price of oil and the 
impact of COVID-19 on the Saudi economy.139 
(1) Military Linkages to Southeast Asia 
Direct, tangible linkages between Saudi security vulnerabilities are tenuous and 
largely indirect at best. Saudi Arabia’s most concerning defense priorities are the military 
threats posed to the Kingdom by Iran, the diminished but resilient specter of Islamic 
terrorism, and the implications of increased economic integration between Persian Gulf 
and Asian economies. Saudi efforts to isolate Iran, in conjunction with the U.S.-led 
Maximum Pressure Campaign, hinged on isolating Tehran economically and 
diplomatically from international forums, markets, and institutions. Unfortunately for 
Riyadh and Washington, D.C., Jakarta has been historically reticent to engage in other 
states’ rivalries, according to Mohamad Rezky Utama, opting instead to remain neutral and 
friendly towards all nations in the Middle East.140 Thankfully for Tehran, a friendly 
Indonesia has helped “counterbalance U.S. pressure by boosting its diplomatic and 
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economic relations with Southeast Asia,” according to Maxwell Lowe.141 Similarly, while 
both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia share an interest in countering jihadi terrorism globally, 
Indonesia has sometimes been leery of the methods that Riyadh has chosen in this effort—
an issue discussed in further detail later.142 The clearest linkage between Saudi and 
Southeast Asian military vulnerabilities has to do with Islamic extremism and jihadi 
terrorism. Saudi Arabia sees jihadist terrorism as a threat that endangers Saudi rule, and 
Indonesia faces a similar threat, having had to deal with the emergence of domestic Islamist 
insurgencies such as Darul Islam in its post-independence period.143 Saudi Arabia for the 
longest time, however, has actively participated in the export of a “rigid, bigoted, 
patriarchal, fundamentalist strain of Islam…[that] has fueled global extremism and 
contributed to terrorism,” according to Scott Shane. This paradoxical role of Saudi Arabia, 
acting as both the “arsonist” and the “firefighter” as described by Shane, has helped 
contributed to the erosion of more tolerant, pluralist Islamic communities.144 Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in Indonesia. 
The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 not only 
frightened governments across the Middle East, but also stirred deep anxieties in states like 
Indonesia and Malaysia due to their societies’ historic interactions with radical Islamic 
ideologies and a long history of jihadi terrorist attacks across Indonesia. Their top concern, 
according to Joseph Chinyong Liow, was that the Islamic State’s extremist ideology will 
“prove attractive to the region’s many Muslims, lure some of them to the Middle East to 
fight as part of the group, and ultimately be imported back to the region when these 
militants return home.”145 Since at least  1979, both Indonesia and Saudi Arabia had dealt 
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with homegrown jihadi extremist groups recruiting or operating within their borders, and 
both have continued to experience terrorist attacks conducted by people affiliated with the  
Islamic State or related groups as recently as 2021 and 2017, respectively.146 Afghanistan 
in the 1980s acted as an incubator for jihadi Salafism, spurred on by Saudi money, created 
spaces for young men to travel from their home countries and engage in jihad while 
receiving both weapons training and more radical indoctrination, before returning and 
potentially establishing terrorist cells in their home countries. In the 2010s, Syria played a 
similar role, with at least 80–90 Indonesian and Malaysian citizens fighting in Syria and 
Iraq alongside the Islamic State, according to Liow’s 2014 report in Foreign Affairs.147 
Both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been able to strengthen their grips at home since the 
emergence of radical jihadi terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s following the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and have been better able to organize state-led responses to uncover, 
disrupt, and attack terrorist groups both at home and abroad. 
Lastly, the expanding consumption of Middle Eastern fossil fuels by Asian 
economies also brings with it concerns about the security of access to these resources, 
linking future prospects of Asian economic growth directly to the stability of the Persian 
Gulf region. The prospect of a diminished U.S. military presence in the region may make 
Japan, South Korea, China, or India feel increasingly pressured to bear the burden of 
protecting energy shipping lanes in order to secure their access to energy resources. These 
expanding economic links between Gulf Arab energy producers and Asian economies 
directly impacts Indonesia, assuming that fossil fuel energy exports will continue to be 
shipped via maritime routes that traverse Indonesian sea choke points. This issue will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapter Three.  
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D. SAUDI FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS INDONESIA: 2000–2021 
While Saudi Arabia faces a wide array of internal and external threats related to its 
political, economic, military, and environmental vulnerabilities (with significant linkages 
to Southeast Asia), none are more pressing on the minds of Saudi leaders than the future 
economic viability of the Kingdom. Indeed, economic reform has now surpassed most 
other policy priorities in the Kingdom as the most pressing, long-term national security 
issue, to include among other issues, Riyadh’s historic role in mediating Israel-Palestinian 
peace. This re-prioritization of problems was on prominent display in an opinion editorial 
published in Al-Quds magazine by Nawaf Obeid, a former advisor to the Saudi 
government, responding to the question of potential Saudi normalization with Israel, in 
which he cautioned that “Arab rulers must pay attention to the importance of setting 
priorities towards developing and diversifying the economies of their countries, paying 
attention to development and not invoking the eternal conflict between the Palestinian and 
Israeli sides.”148 James Russell, in an article on Riyadh’s strategic dilemmas summarizes 
the strategic objectives of the modern Saudi state as follows: 
1. Build and pay for an infrastructure to accommodate its burgeoning 
population that includes the environmental mitigation and adaptation 
program. 
2. Make the necessary investments and political commitments to diversify its 
economy away from domination by the public sector. 
3. Transition from a carbon-based economy to one in which the Kingdom’s 
energy needs are increasingly met by renewable and cleaner energy 
sources to help enable it to meet its carbon reduction commitments under 
the Paris Accord. 
4. Continue to manage the politics of energy markets while simultaneously 
meeting its commitments to reduce carbon output in such a way that the 
Kingdom will maintain its relative power and influence around the world. 
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5. Preserve the shape and identity of the state and the ruling family’s position 
as it manages all the above. (Russell, 2017) 
With Vision 2030 serving as the Kingdom’s chief program in the pursuit of 
economic modernization of Saudi Arabia, according to Sean Foley, “Asian investment, 
pilgrimages, tourism, and trade—both with [Saudi Arabia] and the region that surrounds 
it—are vital to realizing the goals of Vision 2030.”149 Under this premise, this section 
seeks to answer the question: since 2000, what types of foreign policies has Riyadh pursued 
vis-à-vis its state-to-state relations with Southeast Asia, and Indonesia in particular, in an 
effort to shore-up its domestic vulnerabilities or perceived threats? This section seeks to 
shed light on both Saudi bilateral policies with Indonesia, as well as interactions made 
through Saudi-dominated intergovernmental organizations such as the GCC, OIC, MWL, 
and related entities. 
1. Strategic and Diplomatic Relations 
Saudi outreach to Indonesia since 2000 has focused primarily on increasing 
cooperation in trade, energy, and counterterrorism, however Saudi interest in Asia has 
always prioritized expanding ties with major economies in China, India, Japan, and South 
Korea ahead of ties with Southeast Asian states like Indonesia and Malaysia. Modern 
diplomatic relations between Jakarta and Riyadh can be divided into two periods. The first 
period, from 2005 until 2015, overlapped with the reign of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
Al Saud and saw Saudi Arabia adopt a “Look East” trade policy that sought to capitalize 
on the projections of major economic growth across Asia generally.150 During this period, 
no formal agreements were signed between Riyadh and Jakarta besides a memorandum of 
understanding between Indonesia and the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank in 
2006 that implemented relief efforts for Aceh province following the devastating tsunami 
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that hit Indonesia in 2004, and a limited defense cooperation agreement  in 2014.151 
Limited state-to-state interactions did occur, although largely at the informal level through 
economic and business investments, as well as very early formalization of ties between the 
GCC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).152 The second period, 
from 2015 until today, has seen a dramatic acceleration of formal Saudi political and 
economic ties to Asia, including Indonesia, following the 2014 crash in global oil prices.153 
Under the leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and his son, Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has inked several major diplomatic agreements with 
Jakarta and expanded its investments in the Indonesian economy, although still below 
Indonesian expectations.154 
a. King Abdullah Looks East: 2005–2015 
King Abdullah rose to the Saudi throne in 2005 following the death of his half-
brother, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.155 Regarded as a reformist monarch, according 
to Ankit Panda, during his tenure, Abdullah “oversaw a major period of diplomatic 
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rapprochement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and almost every major Asian 
country” which included the first ever state visit of a Saudi monarch to both China and 
India in 2006, as well as trips to Pakistan and Malaysia.156 Motivated by the prospect of 
major economic growth in Asian economies, King Abdullah adopted a “Look East”‘ trade 
policy and, due to Saudi reliance on hydrocarbon exports, established the economic goal 
of having “over half of all Saudi oil exports bound for Asia.”157 By 2009, China overtook 
the U.S. as the number one buyer of Saudi oil.158  
Yet despite Indonesia’s ascension to the G20 in 2008 (and the only ASEAN 
member to date), direct diplomatic engagements with Saudi and Indonesian leaders during 
this period were limited, however, with the only major diplomatic agreement penned 
between Riyadh and Jakarta between 2005 and 2013 being a memorandum on disaster 
relief completed two years after a tsunami struck the province of Aceh.159 Deputy and 
ministerial exchanges did take place, however, with the Saudi Interior Minister, Ahmad 
bin Mohammed Al-Salem visiting Indonesia in 2013, reciprocating a 2012 visit by a special 
envoy of the Indonesian president “who asked Al-Salem to ensure that the rights of all 
Indonesians living in the Kingdom were upheld.” However, according to Yom Machmudi, 
this visit brought no significant developments.160 Despite this gap, Saudi interest in 
expanding its ties more broadly to Asia continued with the expanded Saudi investment in 
Malaysia’s Islamic financial markets in 2009 via the newly created regional office of the 
Al-Rajhi Bank, and the conclusion of a strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and 
India in 2010, referred to as the “Riyadh Declaration” after the city in which it was signed, 
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upgrading its previous agreement from 2006 known as the “Delhi Declaration.”161 
Abdullah refrained from concluding similar agreements with Beijing, however, due to the 
sensitivity of the emerging Sino-American rivalry and Riyadh’s dependence on American 
weapons. According to Foley, “should Riyadh sign a military treaty with Beijing or 
substantially increase its purchases of Chinese weapons, Washington would also likely 
limit Riyadh’s access to the spare parts needed to operate its U.S.-made weapons.”162 
Yamada points out that “Riyadh does not need to take into consideration similar constraints 
in its development of defense cooperation ties with other major Asian states, whose 
projection of power into the Gulf would not alarm Washington.”163 Such a defense 
agreement was concluded between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in January 2014. Focusing 
on the issues of counterterrorism, training, and defense procurement, Saudi Deputy 
Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan Abdul Aziz Al Saud made the first-ever visit 
of a Saudi deputy defense minister to Indonesia in order to sign the joint defense 
cooperation agreement (DCA), however the accord was not ratified by the Indonesian 
government until 2018.164 
Limited and indirect interaction between Saudi and Indonesian officials occurred 
during this period via various IGOs, including the GCC and their ASEAN counterparts. In 
fact, a 2010 ASEAN-GCC Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore that adopted a two-year 
action plan that identified “activities and measures for closer collaboration and cooperation 
to be jointly undertaken for the next two years [between ASEAN and GCC states] on the 
areas of trade and investment, economic and developmental cooperation, education and 
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training, culture and information, and mutual consultation in international matters.”165 
These meetings helped spark additional Gulf Arab foreign direct investment into ASEAN 
and increased, but limited, GCC imports of ASEAN products. According to Mohd Fauzi 
bin Abu-Hussin, in 2011 “Saudi Arabia ranked fifth among Malaysia’s leading sources of 
investment, behind Japan, Korea, the United States and Singapore. Saudi investment in 
Malaysia rose to an estimated US$865 million in 2012.”166 Other investments during this 
period include Qatar Petroleum’s investment in a $4 billion petrochemical complex in 
Vietnam, a Kuwait Petroleum Corporation partnership with Indonesian Pertamina to 
develop a refinery East Java, and Dubai’s Drydocks $2.5 billion project to develop 
infrastructure in Indonesia required to serve the region’s petroleum and petrochemicals 
industries.167 Trade between the GCC and ASEAN also saw a limited increases, with GCC 
exports to ASEAN rising from $43 billion in 2009 to $58.1 billion in 2012, and ASEAN 
exports to the GCC rising from $2.8 billion to $4.7 billion in 2009 and 2012, 
respectively.168 By the end of King Abdullah’s reign, however, the Kingdom’s bilateral 
ties to Indonesia were no stronger than they were a decade beforehand when he first 
ascended to the throne. 
b. King Salman Pursues Reform: 2015–2021 
When King Abdullah died and his brother King Salman ascended to the throne in 
2015, the Persian Gulf was arguably more unstable than at any point in recent history. By 
2014, Iran had managed to consolidate political and quasi-territorial gains across Iraq and 
Syria due to its role in the Syrian civil war, Iraq witnessed the emergence and near take-
over of ISIS, and simmering governance disputes in Yemen led to the capture of Sana’a by 
the Iranian-back Houthi forces.169 Saudi Arabia also found itself leading a 
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counterrevolution to the onset of the Arab Spring, which threatened the existence of Gulf 
Arab monarchies across the region, and faced down plunging oil prices (driven by a Saudi-
led oil price war that sought to preserve its global energy market share and drive American 
shale producers into insolvency) that, by 2016, reduced its financial reserves by $200 
billion.170 During this period, Saudi interest in expanding economic ties to Asia 
accelerated despite already being central to the late King Abdullah’s strategic policies. 
Thanks to the 2014 oil price crash, the Al Saud royal family finally recognized that “the 
country’s oil-centered economy is unsustainable and that Saudi Arabia needs to adapt to 
changing socioeconomic circumstances, in light of the persistence of violent Islamism and 
the eruption of the Arab Spring,” according to Yamada.171 Thus, the security of the Al 
Saud family became inextricably linked to new markets for oil exports, the development 
of renewable energy capabilities, and wider economic diversification.172 Further details of 
economic ties, however, will be discussed in later sections. 
According to the Indonesian Embassy in Saudi Arabia, bilateral relations between 
Jakarta and Riyadh entered a new phase of momentum in 2015 following the state visit of 
newly elected Indonesian president, Joko Widodo (commonly referred to as Jokowi).173 
The purpose, according to The Jakarta Post, was to “strengthen bilateral cooperation, with 
a focus on the economy, energy sustainability, protection for Indonesian citizens and 
strategic industries.”174 Protection of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia is a major policy 
priority for Jakarta, however, given the historic mistreatment of these labor migrants at the 
hands of not just employers and criminal elements, but by the Saudi government itself. In 
2011, following the beheading of Ruyati binti Sapubi, an Indonesian maid working in Saudi 
Arabia who allegedly murdered her employer, Jakarta imposed a moratorium on workers 
 
170 O’Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens 
America’s Power, 268; Marc Lynch, “Saudi Arabia’s Counter-Revolution,” Foreign Policy (blog), August 
10, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/10/saudi-arabias-counter-revolution/. 
171 Yamada, “Saudi Arabia’s Look-East Diplomacy: Ten Years On,” 122. 
172 Yamada, 122. 
173 “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” Government, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018, 
https://kemlu.go.id/riyadh/id. 
174 “Jokowi Gets Busy in Saudi Arabia,” News, The Jakarta Post, September 12, 2015, 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/12/jokowi-gets-busy-saudi-arabia.html. 
49 
traveling to Saudi Arabia “until Indonesia and Saudi Arabia can come to an agreement to 
give rights necessary for Indonesian workers,” according to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
then the president of Indonesia.175 The moratorium was renewed in 2015 following the 
execution of Siti Zainab, which caught Jakarta off guard after neither Indonesian embassy 
officials nor Zainab’s family were given prior notice, according to Foreign Minister Retno 
Marsudi.176 A nearly identical case took place again in 2018 when Saudi Arabia executed 
Tuti Tursilawati, prompting yet another government review of a scheme that the Jakarta 
had setup with Saudi Arabia to try to monitor worker conditions and improve their quality 
of treatment.177 
During this same 2015 trip, Indonesia also concluded a joint Declaration of Intent 
with the GCC, establishing a strategic dialogue between the two entities towards the pursuit 
of closer multilateral cooperation.178 Upon return home, Jokowi secured an agreement 
with Riyadh to “double their bilateral trade value by 2020, as the two countries believe 
they have a lot of potential for expansion.”179 By 2019, however, the value of Saudi 
imports from Indonesia had dropped from $2.59 billion to $2.26 billion, according to the 
OEC. Indonesia’s import value did increase in the same period from $3.02 billion to $3.1 
billion, still $5.24 billion short of its stated goal.180 Saudi Arabia initially reciprocated 
Jokowi’s high-level visit a month later in October by sending the Saudi Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Adel al-Jubeir, to Indonesia to discuss opportunities for cooperation in the fields 
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of “political consultation and coordination, military, security, economic, investment, 
cultural, oil and petrochemical industries, among others.” 181  The stated aim of this 
expanding cooperation was to create a “qualitative leap in relations between the two 
countries in the services of mutual concern as well as the service of the Islamic nation.”182  
In 2017, a year after the unveiling of Vision 2030 by MBS, Saudi Arabia’s 
ambitious domestic and economic reform initiative, King Salman conducted a sweeping 
tour of Asian states with a goal to “identify and expand markets for non-oil exports,” 
according to Kristian Ulrichsen.183 Indonesia was on the agenda, however Saudi-
Indonesian relations had begun to cool due to Jakarta’s anger over the repeated execution 
of Indonesian workers inside the Kingdom, its decision to be neutral in the Saudi-led war 
in Yemen, its call for dialogue between GCC states following Riyadh’s blockade of Qatar, 
and its refusal to join the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition 
(IMCTC).184 Given Indonesia’s long history of non-alignment in other nations’ rivalries 
(most especially during the Cold War), Jokowi saw the creation of the IMCTC “as closely 
associated with…the Saudi-led GCC effort to isolate Iran in the Arab and Islamic world,” 
according to Maxwell Lowe.185 These moves prompted King Salman to “make the first 
visit by a Saudi monarch to Indonesia since 1970. While he did not address concerns about 
the treatment of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia, he announced significant 
investments, attended interfaith meetings, and exchanged handshakes and took pictures 
with women.”186 During this state visit, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia concluded five major 
diplomatic agreements, including a bilateral trade agreement, a cooperation agreement on 
research and education, a cooperation agreement on education and cultural affairs, an 
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agreement on small-medium business development, as well as an agreement to upgrade the 
headship of joint committee.187 
This period between 2015 and 2021 also saw a broadening of opportunities for 
Jakarta to become more involved in events across the Middle East, albeit cautiously. In 
2015, Riyadh initiated a largely unpopular war in Yemen against the Houthi-led militia, 
triggering a call by the OIC for Indonesia to use an already scheduled, five-day Asia-Africa 
conference as a venue to broker peace talks between the warring parties.188  In 2016, 
following the execution of dissident Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia, 
subsequent attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad by Iranian 
protesters, and the severing of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, Jokowi 
sent Foreign Minister Marsudi to the Persian Gulf in an attempt to de-escalate rising 
tensions between the two states.189 Marsudi also took the opportunity to hold related talks 
with her counterparts in the UAE and Oman during the same trip.190 Indonesia’s 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Agus Maftuh Abegebriel, appointed in 2016 by President 
Widodo, also initiated a program called “SAUNESIA,” designed to strengthen bilateral ties 
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between the two nations.191 In 2018–19, following this as well as a series of ISIS-inspired 
terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Riyadh and Jakarta signed three diplomatic agreements 
covering cooperation on religious affairs and extremism, a health agreement for hajj and 
umrah pilgrims, as well as a cultural cooperation agreement.192 
Saudi Arabia’s relations with Southeast Asian states began to weaken between 
2015–2021. In Malaysia, for instance, the close relationship that Saudi leaders had 
cultivated with Najib Tun Razak during his tenure as prime minister, according to Sean 
Foley, “became a burden when Mahathir Mohamad defeated Najib in the 2018 elections—
thanks in part to the accusations of corruption tied to [the 2015] 1Malaysia Development 
Berhad (1MDB), a development bank that allegedly received contributions from prominent 
members of the Saudi royal family.”193 In 2018, following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, 
President Widodo called for a “transparent and thorough” investigation into the death of 
the Saudi Arabian journalist, and in response, Riyadh dispatched Foreign Minister Adel 
Al-Jubeir to Jakarta to convey “a ‘statement and explanation’ to Widodo about the case,” 
according to a statement by Foreign Minister Marsudi.194 
Religio-political organizations in Indonesia have also emerged as a potential 
flashpoint between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, with Saudi officials closely tied to Islamist 
organizations in the archipelago like the Islamic Defenders Front and apprehensive of more 
moderate organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama. In December 2018, Osama bin Mohammed 
Abdullah al-Shuaib, then serving as the Saudi ambassador to Indonesia, purportedly 
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tweeted out pictures of a rally of supporters of the Islamic Defenders Front with a caption 
that suggested that its rival, Nahdlatul Ulama, was “a heretical organization.”195 Shihab 
was quickly replaced by Esam Althagafi as ambassador.196 Despite these embarrassing 
diplomatic gaffs, Jokowi did make a minor hajj to Saudi Arabia in April 2019, just before 
his re-election, however critics argue that this was likely intended more as a measure to 
bolster his Islamic credentials at home more so that it was to mend Saudi-Indonesian 
ties.197 
Finally, tension between Gulf Arab states and Southeast Asia emerged in 2020 in 
relation to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the recent move by the UAE and Bahrain to 
normalize ties with Israel—an especially sensitive topic in Muslim-majority Southeast 
Asia. While by August 2020, according to Amy Chew, neither Indonesian nor Malaysian 
government officials had commented on the Abraham Accords, both former Malaysian 
prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and Nahdlatul Ulama criticized the agreement, 
warning that it could “trigger terror attacks in the Southeast Asian nation and the Middle 
East” and “divide the Muslim world into warring factions.”198 To add to the simmering 
geopolitical tension emerging between rising powers in Asia and the Persian Gulf, in 2021 
Iran concluded a strategic cooperation agreement with China, potentially giving Riyadh’s 
biggest regional rival broader access to Chinese weaponry and economic assistance.199 
2. Economic and Energy Ties 
As addressed in previous discussions about King Abdullah’s “Look East” policy, 
Saudi economic policies over the last decade have focused on mitigating major economic 
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vulnerabilities of a rentier oil economy.200 Saudi outreach to Southeast Asia and Indonesia 
has largely occurred in the fields of expanding trade and investments, energy, foreign labor, 
and religious tourism. While engaging in major domestic programs to diversify the Saudi 
state, tackle unemployment, and ween the nation off of a dependence on oil, Saudi foreign 
policy has focused on expanding its energy market share abroad with a goal of attracting 
Asian consumers, reducing its domestic oil consumption through the development of 
renewable energy options in order to secure its export power, and both directing 
investments into key economic sectors abroad while also courting foreign investment in 
the Kingdom in order to transition its domestic economy away from reliance on the public 
sector.201 Oil is still Saudi’s chief lever abroad, and as Makio Yamada points out, “demand 
security [in the field of oil exports] has been the major concern of the Saudi decision makers 
because of the nature of Saudi Arabia being a rentier state.”202  
In terms of trade relations, as mentioned previously by Yom Machmudi, ties 
between Indonesia and Saudi Arabi remain significant, although Saudi Arabia tends to 
dominate.203 By the time King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 2005, Indonesia and 
Saudi Arabia exchanged only $2.4 billion and $708 million worth of goods, respectively, 
and had signed a bilateral investment treaty two years prior in 2003.204 According to the 
Observatory of Economic Complexity, that year Indonesia imported a total of $68.4 billion 
worth of goods, with only 3.51% of that being Saudi goods.205 By 2015, Jakarta’s imports 
jumped to a value of $144 billion, with Saudi Arabia increasing their exports to Indonesia 
by over $2.3 billion to a total value of $3.02 billion. By 2019, Indonesia imported $3.1 
billion worth of goods from Saudi Arabia, yet Saudi imports from Indonesia dropped from 
the 2015 value of $2.59 billion to $2.26 billion worth of goods, highlighting a major 
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frustration of Indonesian politicians that Riyadh seems to be less invested in the bilateral 
partnership than Jakarta is.206 While the value of Indonesia’s imports from Saudi Arabia 
would appear to grow somewhat, actual tonnage of these imports remained relatively 
steady over the course of the last 20 years, gravitating between a trough of 4.8 million tons 
of goods in 2002, to a peak of 6.8 million tons in 2014, according to Chatham House.207 
The discrepancy between price and weight can be attributed to fluctuations in the price of 
oil. Between 2009 and 2016, according to Machmudi, Riyadh did provide significant 
investments in Indonesian telecom and agriculture, with Saudi companies targeting helping 
develop “new farms in eastern Indonesia covering an area of two million hectares” at the 
value of $1.3 billion in addition to targeting $1.2 billion towards Indonesian telecom and 
related businesses.208 According to the Saudi embassy in Jakarta, Indonesian investments 
in the Kingdom are “limited to food processing and construction only.”209 
Following the unveiling of Vision 2030 and the rapid acceleration of Riyadh’s 
campaign to court foreign investors abroad, King Salman visited Indonesia in 2017—the 
first Saudi ruler to visit in 47 years—and brought with him a royal delegation comprised 
of 620 people as part of his entourage, 800 delegates, 10 ministers, and 25 princes, 
according to the BBC.210 In addition to seeking to expand diplomatic ties with Jakarta, 
King Salman’s visit at this point in time was also “connected to the Kingdom’s plan of the 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of 5 percent of Saudi Aramco, the national giant oil company, 
which is expected to reach a US$2 trillion value, making it the largest IPO ever.”211 
Saudi energy outreach to East and Southeast Asia since 2005 has largely focused 
on courting China first, and then expanding into other major markets like Japan and India. 
Despite Indonesia’s promising growth, Jakarta has remained peripheral to Saudi energy 
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interests in the region. Saudi Arabia had already concluded a strategic energy cooperation 
agreement with Beijing in 1999 even before Abdullah’s “Look East” policy had taken 
shape. According to Lindsey Ford and Max Hill, “between 2000 and 2009, Chinese imports 
from Saudi Arabia increased sevenfold.”212 By 2009, China overtook the United States as 
the top buyer of Saudi oil.213 In the effort to restructure its energy sector in order to reduce 
oil dependence and “adopt a more commercial approach to its business operations,” 
according to Diane Munro, Saudi energy investments abroad have focused largely on 
increasing foreign refining capacity in order to “secure markets for its crude oil 
production.”214 King Salman’s trip to Indonesia in 2017 sought to do just that, with Saudi 
Aramco concluding joint venture agreements for “refineries and petrochemical plants in 
Indonesia and Malaysia worth approximately $13 billion.215  
Easier said than done, however. By 2014, in Indonesia more than 30 budding joint 
ventures related to refinery projects have failed, including agreements with major 
corporations like ExxonMobil, BP and Shell who were forced to drop out from these 
ventures because they were politically motivated but not commercially viable. According 
to an unnamed expert cited by Damon Evans, “it is far cheaper to import finished oil 
products than import the crude oil and refine it in Indonesia.”216 By 2020, the Aramco-
Pertamina project collapsed too, after discussions dragged on for four years. The Saudis 
withdrew, according to Evans, after a disagreement emerged on the valuation of an existing 
refinery in Cilacap. “Aramco had raised its refinery valuation from $2.5 billion to $5.1 
billion. But Pertamina insisted the cost of developing the entire Cilacap refinery would be 
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at least $5.7 billion,” Evans points out.217 While Saudi investments, among other states, in 
Indonesian refineries have flopped thus far, other investors still  seem willing to jump into 
the Indonesian market, with “Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), Russia’s 
Rosneft and Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala are still actively considering potential refining joint 
ventures with Pertamina.”218 The uncertain market outlook driven by COVID-19’s impact 
on energy demand and the subsequent drop in oil prices, however, has also impacted 
Aramco’s identical ventures with other Asian powers too. Despite also concluding an 
investment deal with Beijing in 2017 to build refinery and petrochemical facilities in the 
northeastern Chinese province of Liaoning as part of King Salman’s tour across Asia, Saudi 
Aramco has been forced to suspend the $10 billion deal “as the company slashes spending 
to cope with low oil prices,” according to Alfred Cang.219 
Saudi Arabia’s breakeven oil price to fund government spending has fluctuated 
between $75 to $80 per barrel between 2018–21 projections according to the International 
Monetary Fund, however oil prices as of August 10, 2021, according to The Economist, 
have only recovered to $70.80 a barrel following the pandemic-driven collapse of prices to 
their historic low of $9.12 per barrel in the spring of 2020.220 While Saudi reform efforts 
stagnate because of the slumping energy economy, in terms of demand security, Riyadh is 
also leery of a potentially emerging Sino-U.S. rivalry, which has intensified during the 
COVID-19 pandemic and, according to Foley, “risks drawing Riyadh into a dangerous 
global conflict, where Beijing could, in a crisis, replace Saudi oil imports with Russian or 
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The last two areas of Saudi economic interaction with Indonesia related to foreign 
labor and (largely religious) tourism. Since 2000, the total number of Indonesian migrants 
in Saudi Arabia has consistently increased, from 668,666 in 2000 to 1,709,318 as of last 
year, according to the United Nations Population Division, despite Indonesian government 
efforts to restrict migrant travel.222 This number has also not significantly decreased after 
the unveiling of Riyadh’s Vision 2030 program that sought to reduce the Kingdom’s 
unemployment rate from 11.6% to 7% over the next decade by increasing the employment 
of Saudi nationals in the private sector and reducing dependence on foreign laborers. The 
potential elimination of Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia will have a broad impact on 
the total value of remittances coming into Indonesia. According to a 2009 report by the 
International Organization for Migration, Indonesian remittances from Saudi Arabia were 
valued at $2.2 billion, or 33% of the country’s total remittances overall for that year.223 
Near the end of 2018, this number would increase to $ 2.711 billion.224 While these 
numbers are relatively small compared to Indonesia’s GDP of $1.058 trillion, employment 
opportunities in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere have been key in helping Indonesia reduce its 
overall unemployment rate.225 
Religious tourism is probably the largest people-to-people linkage between 
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia sending 212,730 pilgrims to Mecca in 2019.226 
The economic windfall of annual hajj and umrah pilgrimages each year for Saudi Arabia 
is staggering, adding roughly $12 billion annually to the Saudi economy.227 Saudi Arabia 
has recognized the potential revenue that increased tourism can provide the Kingdom, 
adding an additional National Tourism Strategy to its Vision 2030 portfolio, with the 
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objective of increasing the contribution of its tourism sector to Saudi GDP to more than 
10%.228 
3. Environmental Security and Cooperation 
Saudi Arabia and the broader Persian Gulf’s environmental vulnerabilities are 
numerous, given the fact that the region is acutely vulnerable to climate change and its 
impacts, to include rising temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, coastal erosion and the 
pollution of freshwater sources, and related impacts. Riyadh’s cooperation on this issue, 
however, is largely limited to two levels: globally, as part of its international commitments 
to agreements like the Paris Climate Accord, and regionally, in actions related to the GCC 
and neighboring states. As mentioned in previous sections, Saudi environmental 
cooperation with Southeast Asia is at best indirect, conducted largely through markets or 
through its changing energy policies. Climate change is the biggest environmental threat 
to Saudi Arabia. Yet despite having been seen as “one of the biggest impediments to a 
global deal to limit carbon output” during the 2014 negotiations in Copenhagen (where 
Saudi officials were reportedly responsible for 40% of all committee objections), Riyadh 
did eventually sign on to the 2015 Paris Climate Accord. According to Russell, Saudi 
Arabia has committed to reducing its carbon emissions “by 130 tons annually by 2030.”229 
Riyadh’s biggest actions taken to limit its carbon output, while having an environmental 
impact, are largely related to reform of its energy sector. Munro points out that, through Al 
Saud-led restructuring in 2017, Aramco had planned to “double natural gas production over 
the next decade, invest as much as $50 billion in renewable energy projects, and launch the 
country’s first nuclear power plants,” not for the sake of reducing carbon emissions, but 
instead to meet surging domestic demand for energy related to Saudi population growth 
and rapid industrialization.230 
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In Asia, South Korea has been critical to Saudi renewable energy development 
through cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. According to Hae Won Jeong, “South 
Korea officially expressed an interest in becoming a nuclear energy technology exporter” 
beginning in 2009 with the first export of nuclear technology to the UAE and Jordan.231 
As recently as January 2020, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (KA-CARE) and South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) 
have completed a revised “pre-project engineering contract” to establish a joint entity for 
the commercialization and eventual construction of small,  Korean-designed nuclear 
reactor in Saudi Arabia.232 
Specific cooperation with Indonesia, however, has been limited to Saudi-based 
efforts to achieve food security with minuscule arable land on the Arabian Peninsula. 
Through its economic strength, Riyadh has been able to achieve food security via a market-
based strategy that guarantees access to a diverse array of food suppliers rather than 
pursuing security through production at home.233 Part of this includes Saudi investments 
in agriculture abroad. According to Machmudi, in 2013 alone, “Saudi investment in 
Indonesia in both the agricultural and technological sectors was nearly US$8.65 
billion.”234 Between 2009 and 2016, Saudi investments in new farms across eastern 
Indonesia reached $1.3 billion and covered an area of roughly two million hectares, 
according to Machmudi.235 Moreover, in 2019, Saudi Arabia imported from Indonesia 
over $73.3 million worth of animal product, $191 million in foodstuffs, $403 million worth 
of animal and vegetable byproducts, and $41.9 million worth of vegetable products, 
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totaling $709.2 million—a relatively small figure given the fact that Indonesia exported 
$31.1 billion worth of agricultural products that year.236 
4. Security and Military Cooperation 
Historically, Saudi defense cooperation with foreign partners since 2000 has 
focused on addressing growing dual threats posed to the Kingdom by rising regional 
hegemons, such as Iran, as well as countering jihadi terrorist groups seeking to undermine 
the stability of the Al Saud royal family or their Gulf Arab allies, all while maintaining 
friendly relations with a global power capable of providing a security umbrella to the Saudi 
state—in this case, the United States. Defense and military cooperation with Indonesia has 
only recently become a serious issue for both Jakarta and Riyadh since 2014. Engagement 
between these two Islamic powers were driven in part by their shared Islamic character, as 
both nations found themselves both victims of jihadi terrorist attacks while also being 
pressured to take a firmer stance against radical Islamist ideologies. Oddly enough, modern 
ties between Jakarta and Riyadh have only been somewhat related to the growth of energy 
and economic ties between the Asia-Pacific and the Persian Gulf. In his 2015 assessment 
of Riyadh’s “Look East” policy, Makio Yamada points out that Saudi-Asian relations have 
shown some signs of growing interest in bilateral defense ties: “These may be only 
marginal today, but they appear to be forward-looking.”237 
In terms of supporting Saudi-led efforts to deter regional adversaries and isolate 
Iran, Indonesia has played no part in this largely due to Jakarta’s firm adherence to of its 
norm of non-alignment—a policy readily extended to Indonesia’s international relations 
within the Persian Gulf.238 This reality played out during the 2017–21 Saudi-led blockade 
of Qatar when Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia all refused to participate, rejecting to 
subscribe to what Giorgio Cafiero described as “the Saudi/UAE-led bloc’s narrative of 
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Qatar as a state sponsor of terrorism.”239 This neutrality on the part of Jakarta to embed 
itself in the security structures of the Persian Gulf even extended to its non-participation in 
the Saudi-led war in Yemen (a campaign that even Malaysia withdrew its forces from) as 
well as the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, a project established by MBS but 
seen by some as “a part of the Saudi-led GCC effort to isolate Iran in the Arab and Islamic 
world,” according to Kristian Ulrichsen.240 
In 2014, Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Salman bin Sultan Abdul Aziz Al Saud 
visited Indonesia and signed the first-ever defense cooperation agreement between the 
Kingdom and Indonesia, however while the agreement was also signed by Salman’s 
counterpart, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, the DCA would not be ratified by the 
Indonesian government until 2018 when the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia 
gave their formal approval (oddly enough, this bilateral Saudi-Indonesian defense 
agreement is not listed in the database of international treaties managed by the Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an active defense agreement, while a recent 2021 defense 
agreement between Indonesia and Qatar is listed).241 This agreement focused largely on 
expanding Saudi-Indonesian cooperation in the field of training and education, counter-
terrorism efforts, and expanded Saudi ties to the Indonesian defense industry.242 
Given the context of Saudi policy in the Asia-Pacific between 2014–2021, however, 
this DCA is not unique. While it was one of the first expanded defense agreements that 
Riyadh signed with Asian powers, Saudi officials would sign a similar agreement with 
India only a month later.243 In 2016, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe concluded a 
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memorandum on defense exchange with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman, who was then making an official visit to Japan.244 Saudi officials also concluded 
several defense-related agreements with South Korea in 2019, although while Seoul’s 
military has participated in security activities in the Persian Gulf region, it has gone to great 
lengths to distance itself from U.S.-led or other politically-sensitive operations, “signaling 
the South Korean government’s hesitance to be seen as getting too involved in Middle East 
conflicts,” according to Hae Won Jeong.245 In Southeast Asia, Riyadh’s most effective 
partner has been Malaysia, who has both actively participated in Saudi-led military 
exercises, the IMCTC, and up until recently, in Riyadh’s war in Yemen.246 Saudi Arabia 
has not needed Indonesian assistance in addressing any of its strategic security problems 
over the last decade, suggesting that at least in the near term, Saudi-Indonesian cooperation 
on defense-related issues will continue to revolve around modest counterterrorism 
cooperation and little else. Broader engagement will continue to hit obstacles, however. 
Cultural barriers remain between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia that foster tension rather than 
cooperation. These include overly dogmatic Saudi religious discourse in Indonesia as well 
as a lack of appreciation of religious differences between the respective societies. 
According to Yon Machmudi, “Saudi Arabia’s religious exclusivity is in marked contrast 
to Iran and Turkey, who collaborate with universities and cultural organisations [sic] in 
Indonesia. Both are perceived in Indonesia as more moderate states, and in particular more 
accommodating and respectful of Indonesian religious traditions and culture.”247 
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The intent of this chapter was to provide the necessary data collection and analysis 
required to help us determine in our final conclusion as to whether or not Southeast Asia 
is emerging as a zone of inter-Arab competition. By way investigating contemporary 
Saudi-Indonesian relations, we sought out to identify specific trends in Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policies that may indicate diverging or converging interests with Qatar, and 
whether or not these policies provide any indications as to the presence (or not) of 
collective threats to the GCC as well as the extension (or not) of intra-Arab enmity to the 
Southeast Asian regional security subcomplex. By identifying potentially converging and 
diverging policies, we can then determine whether or not Riyadh’s foreign policies are 
designed in a way that is cooperative with the interests of its Gulf Arab neighbors, or 
competitive and created despite them. 
Based on this research, we have concluded that Saudi Arabia’s most pressing 
domestic vulnerabilities relates to its reliance on oil as the primary driver of its economy, 
as well as the implications that an oil-based economy have had on impeding the emergence 
of a diverse and complex domestic economy. The primary threats to Saudi Arabia, 
therefore, is a future where the price of oil is destined to remain below a price that prevents 
Riyadh from successfully reforming both its economy and society in order to ensure the 
Kingdom’s future solvency. The strongest links between Saudi vulnerabilities and 
Southeast Asia include the increasing economic integration of Saudi Arabia and Asia writ 
large, although major emerging powers in South and East Asia tend to dominate Saudi 
attention more so than any single ASEAN state. Additionally, there exists an indirect, but 
not inconsequential, link between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia as it relates to each states 
efforts to counter jihadi terrorism as well as the implications these policies have on 
domestic security and stability in both Riyadh and Jakarta. 
Between 2000–2021, Saudi Arabia has pursued a variety of economic, political, 
and security-related policies designed to mitigate its domestic vulnerabilities and defuse 
the subsequent threats. Riyadh’s most successful policies include King Abdallah’s “Look 
East” economic policies and investments, especially as it related to the Kingdom’s energy 
exports. While Saudi Arabia’s biggest investment targets have been the economies of 
65 
China, Japan, South Korea, and India, the broader expansion of Saudi and Gulf Arab 
economic activity across Asia promises to trickle into ASEAN as well, albeit at a rate less 
satisfying than what Indonesian leaders had hoped for. Conversely, Saudi Arabia’s weakest 
policies have been those efforts designed to consolidate its wider political influence both 
in the Persian Gulf and across the Muslim world. This not only includes its failed blockade 
of Qatar—which Indonesia and Malaysia rebuffed, but also its rollout of the IMCTC as a 
pan-Islamic military alliance (that only succeeded in recruiting one Southeast Asian 
member state). Saudi Arabia’s most promising but yet-to-be determined is its expanding 
tourism industry, founded on the already-strong people-to-people ties between Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesian pilgrims—assuming that COVID-19 eventually disappears and 
global and regional economies are able to recover. Given this summary, it is difficult to 
characterize Saudi foreign policy towards Southeast Asia and Indonesia as anything close 
to cooperative relative to its neighbors in Doha. 
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III. QATARI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA: 2000–
2021 
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to determine whether or not Southeast Asia is emerging as a zone of 
competition between Gulf Arab states, we must first understand what generally causes 
intra-Arab cooperation or competition. While our earlier literature review suggests that two 
critical variables are the presence and intensity of collective threats to GCC member states, 
as well as the presence and intensity of intra-Arab cleavages, we must understand in more 
detail Qatar’s domestic vulnerabilities, subsequent threat perceptions, and linkages 
between these and Southeast Asia. Doing so will help us identify specific cases where 
Qatar’s interests may overlap with those of Saudi Arabia, potentially providing an avenue 
for cooperation in their policies abroad; as well as help us to identify areas where interests 
may diverge, providing indications of areas where Doha and Riyadh may compete if their 
core interests are threatened. We will then use these indicators as criteria for assessing the 
foreign policies pursued by, in this case, Qatar in order to assess whether or not intra-Arab 
competition in Southeast Asia is an emerging phenomenon. 
This section will begin with an investigation into state-level, domestically-
generated vulnerabilities, threat perceptions, and linkages between these threats to Qatar 
and subsequent foreign policies toward Indonesia. This work will assist in our analysis of 
the regional security patterns of the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia in order to identify 
conditions that incentivize Gulf Arab cooperation or competition. We will assess whether 
or not the policies pursued by Qatar are convergent or divergent with the interests or 
policies enacted by Saudi Arabia in our effort to determine whether or not Southeast Asia 
is indeed emerging as a zone of inter-Arab competition. 
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B. QATARI-INDONESIAN RELATIONS FROM 1971–1999 
While Qatar and Indonesia established formal relations in 1976, embassies between 
the two nations were only opened in Jakarta and Doha in 1996 and 1999, respectively.248 
This twenty-year gap can be attributed first to ongoing consolidation of political power in 
Qatar.249 In 1916, Qatar became a British protectorate following the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire.250 The ruling Al Thani family would never exercise full sovereignty over their 
state’s affairs until 1971 when it declared independence from the British.251 A year later, 
emir Khalifah bin Hamad, seized power from Ahmad bin Ali via coup ushering in what he 
called “The Era of Reform” and significantly expanded Qatar’s diplomatic relations with 
the world.252 Formal relations with Indonesia followed four years later in 1976.253  
As a small, Sunni-led monarchy in the Persian Gulf, Qatar has historically relied 
on Saudi Arabia for protection from external threats.254 Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
emerged as nation-states from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, and both territories 
engaged in significant trade and people-to-people exchanges, including shared religious 
and cultural practices, prior to the imposition of artificial borders following both Saudi and 
Qatari independence.255 While state-to-state relations were generally fraternal,  in the early 
1990s, two factors changed the way Qatar sought to engage with the world: Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990, and the overthrow of emir Khalifah bin Hamad in 1995 by his son and 
crown prince, Hamad bin Khalifa.256 The significance of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, 
“a small, intrinsically defenceless [sic], hydrocarbon-rich country surrounded by larger 
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states with whom it had sporadically antagonistic relationships—was plainly not lost on 
the Qatari elite,” according to Roberts.257 Doha’s relationship with the United States 
expanded during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, with Qatar permitting the 
staging of U.S. forces in the country.258 Indeed, this reliance on an external power—let 
alone a superpower—to help guarantee Qatar’s security from other Persian Gulf powers 
gave Doha a freer hand vis-à-vis the policies it pursued both at home and abroad. This led 
to the first major exchange of diplomats between Doha and Jakarta when, in the spring of 
1995, Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabor Al Thani, Qatar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
visited Indonesia.259 Two years later, in March, 1997, Ali Alatas, the Indonesia’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Doha and helped formalize a joint statement between Qatar 
and Indonesia on the development of bilateral relations—the first agreement between 
Indonesia and Qatar.260 A year later, Indonesia’s government collapsed after protests 
across the country demanding President Suharto’s resignation ended up forcing the three-
decade president from office.261 
C. INDICATORS FOR POTENTIAL COOPERATION OR COMPETITION 
1. Qatar’s Domestic Vulnerabilities and Threat Perceptions 
Identical to the premise provided in the Saudi case study, this chapter recalls that 
the Persian Gulf’s regional security complex is subject to the “politics of state survival and 
regime survival,” due in part to the polarity of the region and the changing nature of great 
power penetration.262 With regional dynamics taking the dominant role, states in the gulf 
face an ever-present reality of state formation and decay. Verhoeven describes this as a 
reality where “the redrawing of borders is not just hypothetical but an empirical reality 
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experienced in the recent past.”263 In our approach towards understanding issues related 
to Gulf Arab national security, we again reaffirm David Baldwin’s critical question: 
“security for whom?”264 Our dominant referent object again in this case is the Qatari state 
apparatus, which includes both the survival and sovereignty of Qatar as a political 
institution, as well as the legitimacy and stability of the Al Thani monarchy and its 
individual leaders.265 We will continue to refer to all of these components, directly or 
indirectly, as the “Qatari state,” unless otherwise noted. Securitizing actors differ based the 
type of vulnerability and threat, which will be discussed in detail in the subsequent pages. 
What then are Qatar’s domestic vulnerabilities and threat perceptions? And what linkages 
exist between these and Southeast Asia, if any? Like our Saudi case study, Qatar’s threats 
can be categorized into a range of economic, political, environmental, and military threats. 
a. Political 
Political vulnerabilities of Qatar, as well as their complementary threats, refer to 
those phenomena that undermine our primary referent object, the sovereign Qatari state, 
including its constituent components such as its national ideas, physical base, and 
institutions.266 Due to Qatar’s status as a hereditary monarchy, much like Saudi Arabia, 
the stable rule of the Al Thani tribe is also a critical factor in the fabric of state institutions. 
Qatar as a nation is still undergoing the process of state formation, with a history of coups 
toppling the ruling emir in both 1972 and again in 1995, and an attempted coup in 1996.267 
The degree of effective political consolidation of power in Qatar has historically served as 
a vulnerability that has left ruling emirs more focused on their domestic stability than their 
interests abroad. However, since coming to power in 1995, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa has 
crafted a widening state bureaucracy-quasi-royal-patronage system that has led to a period 
of significant domestic stability for the Al Thani royal family, culminating in 2013 with 
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the monarchy’s first peaceful transfer of power between Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani and his son (and Qatar’s current ruler), Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.268 According 
to Mehran Kamrava, thanks in large part to Qatar’s energy wealth, the Qatari state 
apparatus has reached “a comfortable degree of political consolidation” reliant on several 
pillars: the role that Al Thani family members exert across state bureaucracies, the power 
of the systems of domestic patronage and clientelism, and the balancing of countervailing 
internal and external forces against one another.269 
This degree of relative domestic political stability reduces Qatar’s major political 
vulnerabilities to two factors: Qatar’s relative size, both in terms of geography and its 
population, as well as its geographic location. While Doha’s economy has thrived thanks 
in no small part to the significant energy deposits in Qatari territory, the limited size of the 
state’s population restricts the number of troops that Qatar can mobilize into its armed 
forces at any given point, and renders the state more vulnerable to larger neighbors like 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its geographic location especially, located in between two would-
be regional hegemons, renders Qatar vulnerable to becoming pulled into a conflict should 
one ever occur. Historically, Qatari foreign policy has sought to shore up these 
vulnerabilities through an increased reliance on soft power in the pursuit of state objectives 
abroad, as well as the expansion of its security partnerships with powers outside the region, 
namely the United States, in order to secure its survival against regional competitors.270  
(1) Political Linkages to Southeast Asia 
Doha’s most sensitive political vulnerabilities relate to its size, both in terms of 
territory and population, as well as its geographic location. The limited population size of 
the nation restricts economic potential given the limited production citizens are capable of 
producing, as well as limits the number of personnel who could theoretically be mobilized 
into military service. Gifted with a largely homogenous society and well-integrated 
minority groups (relative to Qatar’s neighbors) equating to a degree of domestic stability, 
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this leaves exogenous actors as the most likely actor to threaten Doha and the ruling Al 
Thani royal family’s political stability.271 In order to shore up these vulnerabilities, Qatar 
has adopted an atypical policy of going abroad in search of security.272 The most obvious 
linkage between Qatari political vulnerabilities and Southeast Asia is indirect, and lies at 
the heart of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa’s original strategy which he enacted following his 
rise to power in the mid-nineties, seeking to entangle Qatar’s political security in a web of 
overlapping (and sometimes contradictory) alliances with nations beyond the Persian 
Gulf.273 Traditionally, this role was held by historic colonial overseers, including Great 
Britain and the United States. However, while Qatar’s formal strategic partnerships with 
Asian powers have only started to solidify over the last decade, Qatar’s political survival 
has historically relied on its ability to wield its unique brand of soft power, underpinned 
foremost by its economic power and energy dominance. Qatar’s economic itself has relied 
on Asian labor and, more recently, on Asian markets. Should the U.S. reduce its force 
posture in the Middle East, to include a near-complete withdrawal of land-based forces as 
proposed by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Christine McVann, there is speculation by 
some scholars that Qatar’s security, and thus political future, may become increasingly 
reliant on the Indo-Pacific.274 
b. Economics and Energy 
As in our Saudi case study, there remains significant overlap between political 
security and all other categories, none more apparent than in the realm of economics and 
energy. The referent object for our analysis is the sovereign Qatari state. The power of 
Qatar both at home and abroad is reliant on the revenues provided to the Al Thani family 
by their oil and natural gas resources. Kamrava rightly points out that, in the emerging 
post-oil era, the system of patronage and clientelism that underpins Al Thani rule must now 
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be called into question.275 Moreover, while the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which began 
in 2017, has since been rescinded, it revealed structural weaknesses apparent across every 
state in the GCC, according to Karen Young.276 In addition to the state’s reliance on oil 
and gas exports, Qatar, alongside their Gulf Arab neighbors, does not produce its own food. 
Its geography renders the state’s economy vulnerable to basic access to external markets. 
Its only land border is shared with Saudi Arabia, a vulnerability that Riyadh clearly 
exploited during the 2017 blockade.277 Doha is heavily reliant on its air and seaports to 
maintain its economic viability, and its economy is largely dependent on foreigners.278 
Qatar is also heavily dependent on reliable electricity generation for both power and water 
desalination.279 Despite these numerous vulnerabilities, according to the World Energy 
Council, Qatar is self-sufficient in terms of its energy resources, and is capable of meeting 
all its domestic demand.280 With one of the highest levels of urbanization in the world, 
Qatar is also ranked as one of the most “energy equitable” nations on earth, meaning that 
not only are domestic energy prices extremely affordable, but Qatar’s population also has 
broad and robust access to power.281 However, the lack of domestic investment in 
renewable resources means that the overall economy is still reliant on fossil fuels.282 
(1) Economic Linkages to Southeast Asia 
The primary driver behind Qatar’s contemporary global influence is the state’s 
economic power, funded almost entirely by the revenues generated from its energy exports. 
This enables both systems of clientelism at home, helping ensure domestic stability during 
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periods of uncertainty, and also underpins Qatar’s soft power abroad, whether it’s the 
state’s sovereign wealth fund, foreign investments, international branding strategy, or 
purchase of European football teams. Qatar’s economic power, however, is entirely reliant 
on fossil fuels and foreign labor, both of which are heavily integrated with Qatar’s Asian 
neighbors. Giorgio Cafiero puts it succinctly, pointing out that “demand from oil and gas-
thirsty economies in Asia…accounts for 90 percent of Qatar’s exports, [and] has been 
directly connected to the emirate’s prosperity.”283 Therefore, so long as the world seeks 
ways to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, Qatar’s future economic viability will remain 
uncertain, despite the positive, long-term prospects of natural gas. Until Qatar is able to 
thoroughly restructure and diversify its economy, or carve out enough of a corner of the 
fossil fuel market in a potential post-fossil fuel world, trade in hydrocarbons will continue 
to form what John Calabrese calls “the backbone of Gulf-Asia energy relations.”284 
c. Environmental 
While Qatar’s environmental vulnerabilities are almost identical to that of Saudi 
Arabia, the impacts that trends like climate change and environmental degradation have on 
Qatar are magnified due to its small geographic size. Qatar faces the same endogenous and 
exogenous threats afflicting its larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia: population growth, 
migration and urbanization, unequal distribution of scare resources, depletion of water 
resources, minimal arable land, pollution, rising average temperatures related to global 
warming, and sea level rise that threatens coastal urban development.285 According to 
Homer-Dixon, these changes threaten the social and political stability of the Qatari state, 
with potential to create conflict and civil strife in the future.286 
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Qatar is especially vulnerable to sea level rise, water scarcity, and extreme 
temperatures. With 99.2% of Qatar’s population living in urban areas in and around 
Doha.287 As sea levels rise, Doha will become increasingly threatened by coastal erosion, 
land degradation, and potentially significant flooding.288 The Qatari economy, reliant on 
sea ports for its cheapest imports, could drastically suffer if its infrastructure becomes 
unusable.289 Sea level rise also threatens one of Qatar’s most scare resources: water. 
Already one of the world’s most water-stressed nations, according to the World Resources 
Institute, the limited domestic aquifers that Qatar’s population and economy relies on 
threaten to become contaminated by sea water, adding additional stress on the state’s 
desalinization plants.290 Water scarcity and rising temperatures also threaten Qatar’s 
limited arable land, despite the fact that Doha is already heavily reliant on food imports to 
sustain its economy.291 
(1) Environmental Linkages to Southeast Asia 
Much like our case study on Saudi Arabia, any significant linkages between Qatari 
and Southeast Asian environmental security issues, if they exist at all, are at best indirect. 
Qatar and Indonesia are both acutely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and 
related phenomena, including increasing temperatures, coastal erosion, potential pollution 
of water resources, and changing precipitation patterns, among others. Like the linkages 
between Saudi and Indonesian efforts to address climate-related issues, Doha and Jakarta’s 
national initiatives to mitigate these vulnerabilities do not overlap. The most direct tie-in 
between Qatar, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia pertains to food security. According 
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to Sara Fouad Almohamadi, in 2008, Qatar alongside other GCC countries developed an 
interest in achieving food self-sufficiency following the 2008 global commodity crisis due 
to fears of “future disruptions in food supply.”292  
In 2009, Doha created the Qatar National Food Security Program (QNFSP) and 
established the goal of “increasing self-sufficiency from 10% to 70% by 2023.” Failing to 
meet those expectations, Doha then lowered expectations to 40–60% before abolishing the 
QNFSP altogether.293 Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, instead has been forced to rely on the 
global food market access strategy to meet domestic demands, which includes agriculture 
imports from South and Southeast Asia. Between 2009 and 2019, Qatari imports of 
agricultural products from ASEAN member states quadrupled from $28 million worth of 
goods to $129 million, according to Chatham House.294 
d. Military 
Similar to the discussion surrounding political vulnerabilities, Qatar’s most stark 
military vulnerabilities are its small size, physical location in between two would-be 
regional hegemons, and small relative population size which results in both constrained 
economic capacity (especially as it related to the development of a domestic defense 
industry) as well as a limited pool of manpower capable of being mobilized into uniform 
in the event of a national crises.  
Historically, Qatar has attempted to mitigate its geographic vulnerabilities by 
hosting a variety of foreign military powers in its territory. For example, the United States’ 
largest airbase in the Middle East, Al-Udeid Airbase, is located 45 minutes outside of Doha 
and is comprised of not only American, but a variety of coalition forces to include British, 
Australian, French, and other nations’ forces. In 2015, Turkey also expanded its small 
military presence in Qatar after the Saudi-led blockade was imposed, with the expansion 
of the Qatar-Turkey Combined Joint Force Command from 300 to upwards of 2,000 
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personnel, according to Metin Gurcan.295 These forces have helped Doha distance itself 
from Riyadh and Tehran both in terms of its domestic and foreign policies, enabling Qatar 
to engage in a more interventionist foreign policy abroad in places like Libya.296 
Additionally, due in part to the threat posed by an externally-imposed blockade 
against Qatar and a regional arms race sparked by the modernization efforts other states 
like Iran and Saudi Arabia, Doha has pursued “one of the most ambitious armament 
programmes [sic] seen in the Middle East in recent times,” according to Alex 
Gatopoulos.297 Unfortunately, Qatar’s underdeveloped domestic defense sector forces it 
to rely on foreign “original equipment manufacturers” in order to enhance its defense 
capabilities, according to Business Wire, making Doha heavily reliant on external 
cooperation with both Europe and the United States.298 
The last major vulnerability of the Qatari military vis-à-vis its regional neighbors 
is its small population, which limits the total number of recruits that Doha can mobilize 
into its military ranks in the event of a national crisis, and therefor constrains the role that 
Qatari hard power can play in its foreign policy.299 Zoltan Barany points out the unique 
position that contract soldiers play in the armed forces of GCC nations, stating that  
“Qatar’s armed forces are staffed overwhelmingly (up to 85 percent) with contract soldiers, 
many from Pakistan and Sudan and, more recently, also from Colombia.”300 A classic 
example of “small state politics,” this constraint has manifested itself in Qatar’s foreign 
policy by increasing Doha’s reliance on soft power (funded by its energy wealth), foreign 
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investments, a reliance on external protectors, and a deliberate pursuit to brand itself as an 
international “mediator” between warring parties—all aspects of Qatari foreign policy to 
be discussed in more detail later in this paper.301 
(1) Military Linkages to Southeast Asia 
There are very few direct, defense-related ties between Qatar’s domestic 
vulnerabilities and Southeast Asia. Qatar’s geographic vulnerabilities are mitigated largely 
through ties to foreign powers, none of whom are located in Southeast Asia. While Doha’s 
economic ties with the Indo-Pacific are booming, its defense industry and procurement 
strategies have partnered almost exclusively with U.S. defense companies.302 While the 
Qatari economy relies on foreign labor, its foreign contracted military forces largely come 
from Pakistan, Sudan, Colombia, and Somalia and are trained by U.S. contractors, 
according to Barnay.303 In fact, the linkages that do exist are tenuous and indirect, relating 
to phenomena that transcend both regions, such as jihadi terrorism, or security implications 
relating to the broader economic integration of the Persian Gulf and Indo-Pacific.  
Like Saudi Arabia and other GCC partners, Qatar is extremely interested in the 
evolution of, and its vulnerability to, jihadi terrorism, and remains especially concerned 
about groups who advocate for the destruction of gulf monarchies. Indonesia, itself a victim 
of multiple, horrendous terrorist attacked linked to both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, is 
equally concerned about the evolution and proliferation of jihadi groups across the Islamic 
world. However, Qatar’s foreign policy strategies of both “hedging” against the Persian 
Gulf’s traditional hegemons, and “conflict mediation” resulting in Doha’s cultivation of 
close ties to groups like Hamas, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda, has drawn significant criticism 
from both states inside the region as well as outside.304 Regardless of strategy, the 
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changing nature of jihadi terrorism across the world impacts both the Persian Gulf and 
Southeast Asia, indirectly linking the security interests of both regions with one another.  
A second tenuous link between Southeast Asian and Persian Gulf security relates 
to the security implications of their broader transregional economic integration. While the 
U.S. has historically served as a security guarantor of the Persian Gulf since 1980 and the 
formulation of the Carter Doctrine, safeguarding the world’s fossil fuel supply lines from 
Soviet disruption, the future of this system is now in question.305 In 1980, the U.S. led the 
world in global fossil fuel consumption with 19,126 terawatt-hour of energy uses, 
according to Our World in Data.306 Today that spot is held by China, who in 2019 
consumed 33,512 terawatt-hours of fossil energy, up 614% from its 1980 level. In 2019, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia all ranked in the top 12 of global fossil 
fuel consumers, indicative of a growing shift towards Asia in the world fossil fuel 
consumption. For Jakarta, this means that a growing share of the world’s energy exports 
are now passing through three strategic maritime straits that intersect Indonesian 
territory.307 For the U.S., who has steadily reduced its fossil fuel energy consumption since 
1970 while also boosting domestic oil production, this means that the cost of policing 
strategic energy shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf is slowly outweighing its strategic 
benefits.308 This burden may soon fall on the militaries of major Asian oil consumers, such 
as India or China, creating a new transregional energy security dynamic linking the Persian 
Gulf, Indonesia, and East Asian powers. 
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D. QATARI FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS INDONESIA: 2000–2021 
In a 2014 speech at the Paris-based Science Po, Qatari foreign minister Khalid bin 
Mohammed Al-Attiyah reaffirmed that his country’s foreign policy is based on two 
fundamental principles: independence and “a commitment to supporting the rights of 
peoples to self-determination, justice and freedom.”309 While the latter commitment helps 
describe part of the strategy that Doha employs to protects itself from its neighbors, given 
the serious geographic vulnerabilities and political threats facing Qatar, wedged in-
between two increasingly hostile, polarizing, would-be regional hegemons, it is  more 
accurate to say that Doha’s foreign policies over the last two decades have specifically 
pursued two objectives: 1) preserve Qatar’s sovereignty and independence over its 
domestic and political affairs, and 2) maintain the rule of the Al Thani royal family. Being 
highly aware of its limits in traditional aspects of hard power, Doha has often pursued these 
objectives through somewhat creative or non-traditional means.310 Qatar is uniquely 
endowed with both a small and relatively homogenous population with minimal sectarian 
fissures making its politically stable relative to its neighbors, and large energy deposits that 
give it financial security at home and the ability to wield serious geopolitical power abroad 
despite its small size. Doha’s most glaring vulnerability continues to be its size, location, 
and limited population size, yet it has been successful thus far in shoring up its perceived 
vulnerabilities by doubling down on its strengths. In his 2017 study of Qatar’s foreign 
policy, Faisal Mukhyat Abu Sulaib points out that Doha lacks a fully institutionalized 
foreign policy-making bureaucracy like its Saudi or Iranian neighbors. He continues, 
saying that this “gives [Doha] flexibility, but at the same time makes it ambiguous.”311 
Qatar’s foreign policy outreach towards Southeast Asia can be categorized by two 
distinct phases. The first, from 2000 until 2017, highlights Doha’s expanding diplomatic 
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and economic presence across Asia following the ascension of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa 
only five years prior, and the onset of the Arab Spring as well as the rapid onset of political 
instability across the Middle East.312 The second phase, from 2017 until 2021, marks a 
period of increasing intra-Arab animosities between the Saudi-led bloc of Arab states 
against an emerging revisionist led to some degree by Qatar, and climaxing with the 
blockade of Qatar, and concluding in 2021  at the 41st GCC Summit held in Al-Ula, Saudi 
Arabia.313 During these periods, what foreign policies did Qatar pursue with regard to 
Indonesia in order to ensure its sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis its neighbors? As 
we will see in the coming section, Qatar was able to maintain its political sovereignty 
against an onslaught of Gulf Arab coercion thanks largely to its economic ties to Southeast 
Asia.314  
1. Strategic and Diplomatic Relations 
Between 2000 and 2021, Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with Indonesia and 
Southeast Asia writ large coalesced around two themes. Prior to 2017, Doha’s outreach 
centered on expanding opportunities for economic investment across the region in support 
of the ongoing diversification of the Qatari economy. After 2017, Qatar’s efforts 
accelerated the expansion of political, economic, and security agreements with other 
nations with the intent of denying the successful isolation of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and the UAE. 
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a. Doha Solidifies Diplomatic Ties with ASEAN: 2000–2017 
In October 2008, Doha launched its Qatar National Vision 2030 modernization 
project.315 Five years later, Doha rolled out a formal “Look East” strategy that sought to 
foster closer economic and political engagement between Qatar and ASEAN. Such ties had 
only occurred informally during the years prior, such as the Qatar Investment Authority’s 
interest in developing joint Qatar-ASEAN investment funds in 2012, according to Felix 
Sharief.316 This strategy accelerated in earnest five years later after the ascension of Emir 
Tamim bin Hamad to the Qatari throne in 2013. Shortly thereafter, Qatar’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs discussed its intent to open a dedicated unit to explore expanding ties with 
ASEAN member states, according to the Gulf Times.317 This came five years after the 
GCC established a GCC-ASEAN Economic Centre (GAEC) in Kuala Lumpur in August 
2008.318 As we will see in later sections, prior to 2013, Qatar’s ties to ASEAN had already 
been expanding, and were largely limited to complementary economic interests, according 
to Zachary Keck.319  
Formal high-level engagements between Qatari and Indonesian officials occurred 
regularly and focused on either bolstering economic ties or were generic meetings on the 
sidelines of larger forums. In April 2006, Indonesia’s then president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, visited Qatar to discuss a number of issues aimed at fostering economic and 
investment cooperation between the two nations. By December 2007, the Qatar Investment 
Authority announced an agreement with Indonesia establish a $1 billion firm to “invest in 
natural resources and infrastructure in Southeast Asia’s biggest economy,” according to 
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Muhamad al-Azhari and James Cordahi.320 In 2009, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani 
visited Jakarta in May of that year on a trip made in return for Yudhoyono’s previous visit 
to Qatar in order to sign a formal economic agreement between the two countries.321 In 
2011, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani met with 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta while visiting Bali in order to participate 
in the opening session of the 4th Bali Democracy Forum.322 According to his speech, 
Hamad bin Jassem announced that Qatar had sought to “expand the base of [political] 
participation [in Qatar] as an outgrowth of the reform project initiated by His Highness 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.”323 While it is highly unlikely that the foreign 
minister of a Gulf Arab absolute monarchy had chosen Indonesia as the prime location to 
announce his government’s intention to democratize, this forum had convened in the early 
days of the Arab Spring after the overthrow of rulers in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. It was 
more likely that Qatar’s intent, in keeping with its broader hedging strategy, was intended 
to curry favor with the wider democratic wave sweeping the region, should it ever reach 
Qatar’s shores. The visit itself had nothing to do with improving Qatar-Indonesia relations. 
In May 2015, Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, visited Doha 
as a prelude to the first official state visit to Qatar of President Joko Widodo, who visited 
Doha in September.324 During this meeting, Marsudi briefed Emir Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani on “the efforts and endeavours [sic] of Indonesia and Malaysia to tackle 
the issue of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh,” to which the Emir 
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pledged $50 million in support of Indonesia’s efforts.325 By in large, it appears that at least 
during this period, Indonesian outreach to Qatar was more important to officials in Jakarta 
than was Doha’s outreach to Indonesia, with Indonesian officials courting Qatari financial 
support for economic investments or conflict resolution efforts. Qatar, while receptive to 
these overtures, was more focused on its footing in the Middle East’s fluid political 
environment. 
b. The Arab Spring, the Exacerbation of Intra-GCC Cleavages, and the 
Beginning of the Gulf Crisis: 2017–2021 
The onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 and diverging Gulf Arab intervention in 
Egypt, Syria, and Libya exacerbated intra-Arab cleavages based on opposing government 
perceptions of how to respond to emerging trends in the Middle East, most notably with 
the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political forces in the 
region.326 Qatar, always leery of its neighbors’ intentions, soon found itself being 
increasingly coerced by an emerging “Anti-Terror Quartet” (ATQ) composed of Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE, which Doha feared was maneuvering to limit Qatar’s 
sovereignty, and outsource its  foreign policy, according to Kristian Ulrichsen.327 
After the blockade was imposed against Qatar in June 2017, Emir Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani kicked off a series of official foreign visits in an effort to counter GCC-
led isolation of the Gulf state. While relations with states in Southeast Asia were relevant 
to Doha’s economic and investment strategies prior to 2017, it is clear that the region only 
played a small part in Qatar’s overall counter-blockade strategy. In September 2017, 
Tamim made official visits to Turkey, Germany, France, and the United Nations General 
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Assembly in New York.328 A month later in October, Tamim visited state leaders in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.329 In January of 2019, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al 
Thani returned to Asia, this time in a whirlwind trip to South Korea, Japan, and China.330 
In addition to these clusters of visits, Tamim concluded a number of diplomatic 
agreements, including with the United States in July 2017 and with the UK’s Prime 
Minister Theresa May a year later.331 In addition, in 2019 he also held talks with several 
of his international counterparts to discuss strengthening of relations, including India’s 
Prime Minister on the sidelines of the 74th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, and President Donald Trump during an official visit to the White House.332 
Between June 5th, 2017 when the blockade began, and January 5th, 2021 when it was 
rescinded at Al-Ula, the Qatari emir visited Southeast Asia only once. Indonesia’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, would visit Qatar only twice during this period. The 
first visit was days after the blockade was imposed, and Marsudi reportedly only met with 
Indonesia’s Ambassador to Qatar, Muhamad Basri Sidehabi, in order to get “a report on 
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the current situation and the circumstances of Indonesian citizens in Qatar.”333 Marsudi’s 
second visit took place on February 29th, 2020, during a “working visit” to attend the 
signing of the peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
of which Indonesia played a key facilitating role.334 Oddly enough, while President 
Widodo never visited Doha during the gulf crisis, he did visit Saudi Arabia in 2019 for an 
umrah pilgrimage and again in 2020 to attend the Arab Islamic American Summit, and also 
made a trip to Abu Dhabi in 2020 to reciprocate a 2019 visit to Indonesia by UAE Emir 
Mohammed bin Zayed.335 In addition to this, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi also 
made a formal visit to Bahrain September 2019 to discuss opportunities for broader 
economic cooperation between Jakarta and Manama.336 Between June 2017, when the 
initial blockade against Qatar was announced, and January 2021 when Saudi Arabia 
brought the blockade to a close at the 41st GCC Summit at Al-Ula, , it is clear that Qatari 
foreign policy had prioritized outreach to Southeast Asian states in an effort to prevent its 
isolation, but only as a smaller piece of their overall global strategy. Meanwhile, while 
politicians and envoys dispatched by Jakarta to the region did play a role in mediating 
dialogue between Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet, it is also apparent that official state 
visits to Qatar by Indonesian officials dropped off between 2017–2021, yet official 
delegations continued to be dispatched to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, either to 
serve domestic political interests (such as Jokowi’s umrah to Mecca just prior to his re-
election bid in 2019), or to court Gulf Arab investment in Indonesia (such as Retno 
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Marsudi’s aforementioned Bahrain trip).337 Guy Burton also points to an implicit 
rebalance away from Qatar and towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE by Indian and Chinese 
business and political leaders during this period, citing the fact that “politically and 
economically, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were—and are—far more important in the region 
than Qatar.”338 
2. Economic and Energy Ties
How did Qatar’s economic ties to East and Southeast Asia help mitigate its most 
pressing domestic vulnerabilities? Arguably, Qatar’s economic prowess is central to both 
its “soft” and “smart” power, without which Doha would find itself quickly pulled under 
Saudi control. Kristian Ulrichsen and Theodore Karasik argue that Qatar’s economic ties 
to Asia, established and expanded well before 2017, were at the forefront of preventing the 
successful isolation and subordination of Doha to its more powerful neighbors. Ulrichsen 
and Karasik argue that “oil- and gas-thirsty countries in Asia with vibrant, fast-growing, 
and dynamic economies [placed] much value on their relations with Qatar, the world’s top 
producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In addition to the economic 
importance that major Asian countries have placed on Qatar, governments in China, Japan, 
South Korea, and elsewhere in Asia have never perceived the threat that Doha allegedly 
poses.” They continue, adding that “Within this context, the ATQ countries [composed of 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE] found no sympathy for their anti-Qatar 
campaign in Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and virtually all other Asian capitals. On the contrary, 
these Asian actors see the GCC crisis as a threat to their own interests, for numerous 
reasons, and have joined the international community in backing the Kuwaiti emir’s efforts 
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to mediate a settlement to the Gulf dispute.”339 Complementing this, David Roberts 
argues:  
LNG policies were crucial in facilitating the state’s escape from Saudi 
Arabia’s ‘gravitational pull’…in two ways. Firstly, they allowed Qatar 
financially to engage in a range of policies through which it sought to 
expand beyond its previously Saudi-dominated external relations to the 
wider international community. Pursuing these policies helped Qatar 
become a meaningful international actor rather than merely a small-scale 
regional player. Secondly, they deliberately intertwined Qatar with a 
number of key international countries in an inextricable and crucial energy-
economic nexus. Qatar was diversifying its international alliances and no 
longer needed to toe Saudi Arabia’s line. (Roberts, pg. 54, 2017) 
Prior to 2017, Qatar was already equipped with a growing economy based on “strong 
fundamentals” that translated into a “decade of budget surpluses by 2014 and resulted in 
one of the highest levels of GDP per capita in the world.”340 The discovery in 1971 of a 
large gas field that transcended Qatari and Iranian borders, and subsequent Japanese 
investment in developing this field in the mid-1990s helped usher Qatari LNG into the 
Asian market, linking the national security concerns of major Asian powers like South 
Korea, Japan, China, and India directly to the stability of the Qatari economy.341 Roberts 
also points to strong economic growth of ASEAN and East Asian economies between 
1980–1992, leading directly to increased energy demands, thereby pulling Qatari energy 
resources further into the Asian market.342 From 2008 onward, economic development at 
this point was focused on “sustainable development” in line with the state’s Vision 2030 
plan. Likely driven by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa’s 1995 philosophy of seeking ways to 
distance Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Hamad sought to diversify Qatar’s trading partners in 
order to reduce his dependence on the GCC as a whole. According to Ulrichsen, “the 
diversification of trade routes and the productive base were in line with Qatar’s longer-
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term National Vision 2030 but were accelerated and brought forward by the blockade.”343 
This would prove to be a brilliant move.  
By the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis in 2017, “trade with East Asian partners rose 
significantly in the first year of the blockade, particularly with China but also with Japan 
and South Korea, and more than replaced the falloff in GCC trade, with the figure for trade 
with Asia (including Turkey) rising from 61 per cent to 69.5 per cent of total trade,” 
according to Kristian Ulrichsen.344 Giorgio Cafiero also points out that while Japan, China, 
India, and South Korea remain Asia’s top buyers of Qatari liquefied natural gas, ASEAN 
members had become increasingly valuable partners of Qatar in recent years, “collectively 
holding a share of half of Qatar’s market. Doha’s top ASEAN export partner is Singapore, 
rising from the number five export partner last year, receiving 5.3 percent of the emirate’s 
exports.”345 
In addition to Doha’s expanding energy and trade ties to Asia, investments became 
a major tool for Qatari smart power. In 2005, Qatar’s emir established the Qatar Investment 
Authority, the state’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) that not only targeted investment in 
particular sectors in order to facilitate the transfer of intellectual property and technology 
back into Qatar in order to feed its National Vision 2030 economic diversification program, 
but alongside the Qatar National Bank and other major financial hubs, the QIA also helped 
provide “internationally influential states with higher stakes in Qatar remaining an 
independent and sovereign country,” according to a conversation between a renowned 
Qatari journalist and Kristian Ulrichsen which took place in 2016.346 An arm of Qatari 
smart power, the broad investments made by QIA and other national entities took place “in 
a dynamic context within which mutually reinforcing relationships are forged with the 
three other aspects of the country’s foreign policy—military security, hedging, and 
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especially branding.”347 The intent of these investments, according to the unnamed 
journalist, was indeed intended to “prevent Qatar from being ‘another Crimea.’”348  
Not all investments were successful, however. While Qatari investments in 
Indonesia have focused particularly on sector on their communications sector through 
Indosat Ooredoo, financial and banking investments through the QNB, and energy 
investments via Nebras Power, according to Qatar’s Ambassador to Indonesia, Fawziya 
Edrees Salman Al Sulaiti, Doha’s investments in tourism via QIA fell flat. The much-
celebrated visit of Emir Tamin bin Hamid Al Thani to Indonesia in October 2017 did not 
encourage the level of Qatari investment in Indonesia that Jakarta had hoped for, ending in 
what The Jakarta Post described in 2021 as “the miserable failure of Qatar’s plans to invest 
$500 million in Indonesian tourist destinations.”349 The positive side of trade relations 
between Indonesia and Qatar, however, is the fact that they keep increasing. Trade between 
Indonesia and the Persian Gulf “has climbed by 40%, from US$8.68 billion in 2016 to U.S. 
$12.15 billion in 2018. Similarly, two-way investments between Indonesia and the Gulf 
rose by 26%, from US$60.3 million in 2016, to US$76.1 million in 2018.350 Despite the 
COVID-19 global pandemic, the total value of trade between Doha and Jakarta already 
rebounded back up to $825 million in the first eleven months of 2020, nearly reaching its 
pre-pandemic level of $1.1 billion set in 2019.351 
3. Environmental Security Issues and Cooperation 
In both the lead up and execution of a blockade against Qatar imposed by Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, Doha’s efforts to shore up its environmental vulnerabilities 
with partners in Southeast Asia were minimal. Despite Zachary Keck pointing out in 2013 
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that Qatar and ASEAN states have complementary insecurities relating to food and energy 
respectively, direct Qatari cooperation between 2000–2021 with Indonesia or other 
Southeast Asian states on issues related to Qatar’s environmental vulnerabilities appears to 
be largely non-existent, with only a modicum of engagement occurring indirectly on issues 
relating to Qatar’s overall approach to food security.352 Even then, Qatari investments in 
farms and agriculture in Indonesia remain a mere prospect for future investment following 
the lifting of the Saudi-imposed blockade on Qatar, rather than a reality.353 While Doha 
does import agricultural products and foodstuffs from ASEAN member states ($60.3 
million in 2010, $92.5 million in 2015, and $129 million in 2019 according to Chatham 
House), the total value of these imports overall has never exceeded 5% of Qatar’s total 
agricultural imports. In 2019 alone, Qatar imported its highest value of agricultural 
products from Indonesia yet, totaling $5.3 million but only equating to .4% of Doha’s $2.3 
billion total agricultural imports that year.354 In fact, according to Chatham House, Qatar’s 
largest non-GCC sources for food imports over the last decade has consistently been 
Australia, India, and Brazil.355 
In 2015, two years prior to the implementation of a blockade, Piroon Laismit, 
Thailand’s ambassador to the state of Qatar, offered his country’s “expertise in the fields 
of agriculture and aquaculture, including hydroponics, to support Qatar’s food security 
programme [sic],” according to Peter Alagos of the Gulf Times.356 However, the strongest 
tie-in between Qatari foreign policy related to its food security and Southeast Asia is 
exemplified by the role that Hassad Food, a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority, 
played in alleviating the impact that the 2017 blockade had on Qatar’s food supply.357 A 
key component of the organizational and logistical infrastructure that Hassad Food had in 
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place was Hassad Australia. According to Kristian Ulrichsen, Hassad Australia was 
founded in 2009 “as Hassad Food’s first overseas venture, which at its peak owned nearly 
300,000 hectares of prime farmland across Queensland, Victoria, New South Wales, South 
Australia, and Western Australia.”358 While the QIA has expanded investments into 
regional neighbors, injecting $5 billion in 1Malaysia Development Berhad in 2017, as of 
2021, Indonesia continues to remain hopeful about the prospect for future Qatari 
investment in its sovereign wealth fund.359 
4. Security and Military Cooperation 
Qatar’s approach to shoring up its domestic military and security vulnerabilities 
followed the same pattern as the rest of its foreign policies since the ascension of Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa in 1995: reduce Doha’s dependence on Riyadh while increasing the 
interest that external powers have in a free and independent Qatar. It did this through two 
primary avenues. First, by allowing the limited basing of the armed forces of foreign 
military powers on its territory to both enhance Qatar’s ties with those powers while also 
using them as a deterrent from Saudi (or other nations) direct military intervention. 
Arguably, the reason Saudi Arabia and other Sunni regional powers were limited in their 
ability to coerce Doha into subservience through military force in both the 2014 and 2017 
gulf crises was due in large part to the presence of U.S. military (and Turkish) forces on 
the peninsula. Second, Qatar continued to expand the number of bilateral security and 
defense agreements it had with foreign states. While few of these agreements directly 
mentioned that the party would come to Doha’s aid in the event of invasion, the conclusion 
of said agreements represented a form of military-diplomatic soft power that enabled Doha 
to communicate the fact that it was not isolated, and that it still had friends abroad. It is 
also worth noting that between 2012–2021, Qatar did not shy away from using its hard 
power assets to secure its vital national interests, most notably in a limited military 
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intervention in Libya in 2011.360 However Doha also participated in several international 
and GCC-led military campaigns, including the U.S.-led intervention in Libya in 2011, 
during the activation of the Peninsula Shield Force to intervene in Bahrain in 2011, as well 
as in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen following the Houthi takeover in 2014.361  
However, beyond welcoming the presence of foreign military forces into its 
territory and engaging with the regions’ multilateral institutions (both in terms of bilateral 
Qatari-ASEAN outreach as well as part of broader GCC-ASEAN efforts), what policies 
did Qatar pursue with both Indonesia and Southeast Asia between 2000–2021 that helped 
Doha shore up the state’s domestic security vulnerabilities? The answer is underwhelming. 
While Qatar made significant overtures to expand its bilateral military cooperation 
agreements with Asian powers, none of them ever translated into comprehensive strategic 
partnerships let alone serious defense agreements. In fact, the only power across all of Asia 
that maintains a strategic partnership with Qatar is China, according to Guy Burton in 2021: 
The disparity between the Saudis and the UAE on one side and Qatar on 
the other was…evident in the nature of the Gulf states’ political cooperation 
with India and China as well. By 2018 China had established 
comprehensive strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the 
highest form of engagement it can offer another country. In contrast, 
China’s relationship with Qatar was only a strategic partnership, which it 
had agreed in 2014 and showed no interest in upgrading when Sheikh 
Tamim Al Thani visited Beijing in 2019. India has similarly expansive 
arrangements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It established a Strategic 
Partnership Council with Riyadh and has also sought to cultivate closer 
security ties with the two. In recent years that has been expressed in its 
efforts to bring Riyadh and Abu Dhabi onboard in India’s rivalry with 
Pakistan. (Burton 2021) 
During Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad’s visit to Indonesia in 2017, Jakarta was purportedly 
only interested in expanding economic, investment, and trade relations between the two 
states. Indonesia would eventually conclude a limited bilateral defense cooperation 
agreement with Qatar twenty-three days after the Al-Ula conference ended the blockade. 
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On 28 January 2021, Qatari and Indonesian delegates signed a letter of intent on bilateral 
defense cooperation in Jakarta that called for the exchange of high level officials, 
promotion of education and training cooperation, promotion of each state’s defense 
industries, while leaving the relationship open-ended for other opportunities to 
cooperate.362 Malaysia, however, was willing to move forward in expanding defense 
relations with Doha a bit sooner, and in 2017 envoys from Doha and Kuala Lumpur signed 
a  Letter  of  Intent  in  2017  establishing a High Level Committee to  explore  potential  
opportunities for cooperation  “in defence capabilities, as well as intensify cooperation in 
exchanging intelligence information related to fighting terrorism.”363 Malaysia, according 
to a subsequent white paper published by its Ministry of Defense, “will continue to play a 
leading role in promoting more credible partnerships among Muslim countries such as 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar and Turkey, by focusing on defence [sic], science, technology 
and industry.”364 Regardless, Qatar’s ability to strengthen its military and defense 
weaknesses against the potential encroachment of Saudi Arabia and Iran rested more 
squarely on its economic power, trade links, and while the military played a small role, it 
was generally within established avenues of military diplomacy, not confrontation.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this chapter was to provide the necessary data collection and analysis 
required to help us determine in our concluding analysis as to whether or not Southeast 
Asia is emerging as a zone of inter-Arab competition. By way examining Qatar-Indonesia 
relations, we sought to identify specific trends in Qatari foreign policies that may indicate 
diverging or converging interests with its Saudi neighbor, and whether or not these policies 
provide any indications as to the presence (or not) of collective threats to the GCC as well 
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as the extension (or not) of intra-Arab enmity into Southeast Asia. By identifying 
potentially converging and diverging policies, we can then determine whether or not 
Qatar’s foreign policies are designed in a way that is cooperative with the interests of its 
Gulf Arab neighbors, or competitive and operating despite them. 
Based on this research, we have determined that Qatar’s most pressing domestic 
vulnerabilities relate is its small size, both in terms of territory, food production 
capabilities, as well as population. These vulnerabilities generate a litany of threats to 
Doha’s political sovereignty, to include direct military invasion, coercion related to the 
cutoff of external food imports, and wider isolation from global markets. While links 
between these vulnerabilities and Southeast Asia did nominally exist, they were largely 
indirect or were merely a smaller component of a wider global phenomenon. 
In an effort to mitigate these threats, between 2000–2017, Qatar first pursued a 
deliberately strategy to reduce its economic and political reliance on Saudi Arabia and the 
wider GCC while also maintaining a degree of participation within regional institutions to 
placate potential critics. These efforts accelerated after 2017 and the imposition of a wider 
blockade against Qatar by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. Second, before 
2017, Qatari officials sought to enmesh the state in a wide array of foreign economic and 
political relationships to the point that numerous external powers maintained an interest in 
a free and independent Qatar. Doha found its most successful efforts in its economic 
outreach to other nations, largely due to its dominance of the global LNG market. During 
the blockade, Qatar found receptive ears in numerous places, but especially in Jakarta 
where Indonesian officials not only refused to participate in the Saudi-led blockade of 
Qatar, but actively took a role in mediating an end to the conflict. 
Based on this summary of Qatari outreach to Indonesia in the shadow of Doha’s 
wider domestic vulnerabilities, can we conclusively determine whether or not Qatari 
foreign policy was designed to compete against the interests of its Saudi neighbors? The 
results are less clear. Given the fact that so much of Saudi efforts over the last decade have, 
to varying degrees, sought to coerce Qatari behavior into certain bounds, we can safely say 
that Qatari policy at least was not designed to compete against Saudi policies so much as 
it was designed to deny Saudi goals. 
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In this study, we set out to understand whether or not Southeast Asia is emerging 
as a zone of competition between Gulf Arab states who themselves are vying for regional 
hegemony in the Middle East. This question was initially sparked by the research 
conducted by Harry Verhoeven, Jos Meester, and Willem van den Berg on this very 
phenomenon emerging in East Africa between 2015 and 2018.365 To answer this question, 
we sought to understand under what conditions Gulf Arab states cooperated with one 
another in their foreign policies, and when they instead chose to compete against one 
another. In our review of the literature available, we identified two structural variables that 
factored heavily in determining whether or not Gulf Arab powers chose to compete or 
cooperate with one another: the presence and intensity of collective threats to Gulf 
Cooperation Council member states, and the presence and intensity of intra-Arab 
cleavages. These two variables directly affected the domestic threat perceptions of Gulf 
monarchs as well as their policymaking mechanisms and, through state strategies of 
“omnibalancing” and “managed multi-dependence” which sought to neutralize domestic 
threats through international assistance while limiting the influence of international powers 
had over Gulf regimes, manifesting in the nature of their foreign policies towards states 
outside of the Persian Gulf regional security subcomplex.366 Using this as an analytical 
framework, this research concludes that Southeast Asia is not emerging as a zone of 
competition between Gulf Arab powers due to several reasons: the lack of a collective 
threat to the GCC emerging from within the Southeast Asian regional security subcomplex, 
and the lack of conditions present in the same region that could exacerbate intra-Gulf Arab 
cleavages. 
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B. DISCUSSION 
Based on our previous research, we determined that two conditions had to be 
present within the Persian Gulf-Southeast Asia transregional relationship in order to 
generate conditions that incentivize competition between Gulf Arab states: collective 
threats to GCC states had to be minimal or non-existent, and intra-Arab cleavages had to 
be maximized. Based on our comparative analysis of both Saudi and Qatari foreign policies 
towards Indonesia since 2000, we can conclude that neither of these conditions were met 
in regards to the structure of international security in Southeast Asia during this period. 
First, we determined that neither Qatari or Saudi domestic vulnerabilities between 
2000–2021 were tied significantly to potential threats emerging from, or related to, 
Southeast Asia, satisfying the first condition of minimizing collective GCC threats. Saudi 
Arabia’s most salient domestic vulnerability is its reliance on oil, which threatens to render 
the Kingdom insolvent in a matter of years should the world begin to wean itself off of 
fossil fuels. Qatar’s chief vulnerability stems from its size and geographic location, creating 
a serious threat for political and economic isolation. Far from enabling intra-Arab 
competition, however, Southeast Asia may be instead emerging as a lifeline to Gulf Arab 
regimes who are undertaking significant political and economic reforms to diversify their 
economies and adapt their oil-dependent economies to be more globally competitive. 
Paradoxically, increasing energy consumption on the part of major Asian economies 
appears key helping states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia manage this transition as Western 
economies begin to either produce more energy at home (such as in the case of the U.S.), 
or switch to alternative sources of energy (such as France and Germany).367 
Second, while the Arab Spring triggered a wave of inter-Gulf Arab enmity which 
culminated in the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, this rivalry was not reflected in any 
meaningful way towards the GCC by ASEAN member states, despite the efforts of both 
Riyadh and Doha to recruit support for their actions during the height of the blockade. 
Gone are the days of the 1970s and 80s where the oil boom and 1979 Iranian Revolution 
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kicked off a competition for ideological influence between Riyadh and Tehran on the 
streets of Malaysia and Indonesia.368 Instead, in state-to-state relations today, Asian 
powers chose to remain neutral in the Saudi-Qatar rivalry or actively served as mediators 
throughout the conflict, such as in the case of Indonesia, whose foreign minister shuttled 
between Persian Gulf capitals as a neutral peacemaker. The inter-Arab enmity that was 
present in the Persian Gulf in 2017 has also abated to some extent, potentially related to 
the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, an increasingly confrontational Iran, Gulf Arab 
normalization with Israel, and the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic, all of which have 
a significant impact on GCC perceptions regarding the nature of collective threats.369 A 
deeper dive into these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Despite the 
signing of a reconciliation agreement between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Persian Gulf 
states in January 2021, trust between Riyadh and Doha may never be fully repaired.  
C. IMPLICATIONS 
Using an analytical framework derived from the research conducted by Harry 
Verhoeven, Jos Meester, and Willem van den Berg on intra-Arab competition in East 
Africa (now represented in Figure 2), this thesis was able to successfully apply this 
framework to assess the nature of intra-Arab foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. This 
research uncovers several significant implications for academics and policymakers who 
focus on the Persian Gulf to pay attention to. The first implication of this study is that 
Qatar’s ability to operate independently of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states was 
bankrolled entirely by its strong, LNG economy. Should the world begin to wean itself off 
of fossil fuels in favor of renewable or alternative energies, then Doha’s leverage against 
its neighbors may weaken and its stature on the world stage diminish, drawing further into 
the Saudi sphere of influence. Secondly, with regards to Saudi foreign policy, it is clear 
that beyond revenues generated by the Saudi energy sector, the ability of Riyadh to project 
serious soft power both inside the Persian Gulf and abroad is limited. Despite enacting 
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strict sanctions against Qatar in the form of a blockade, Saudi Arabia was unable to corral 
significant support for this measure within the Persian Gulf (Oman and Kuwait remained 
neutral), within the Islamic world (Malaysia and Indonesia, among others, remained 
neutral), or beyond. These findings should act as a warning bell to Saudi policymakers 
who, in the event of a significant change in world energy demands, must invest heavily in 
repairing their image abroad, bolstering their soft power capabilities, and reducing their 
reliance on coercive measures to achieve national objectives. 
 
Figure 2. Revisiting Our Analytical Framework 
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While this thesis was successful in developing and applying an analytical 
framework to help us better understand how the structure of regional security patterns 
between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia determines their ultimate foreign policy 
decisions, gaps in this framework remain that are worth investigating. The first gap relates 
to the edges of our identified analytical framework. The research conducted by Verhoeven, 
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Meester, and van den Berg was successful in validating the relationship between our 
identified variables and outcomes of Gulf Arab cooperation or competition (quadrants two 
and three in the previous figure). However, this research identified a case of Gulf Arab 
outreach to another region of the world that did not fit cleanly into either of these 
categories, instead occupying a space where neither cooperation nor competition was the 
projected outcome—an ambiguous gray area. Further research into the nature of Gulf Arab 
state behavior in these scenarios (quadrants one and four) is worth exploring, especially to 
better understand how Gulf Arab states may behave in circumstances where both collective 
threats to the GCC are high in addition to a high degree of intra-Arab cleavages.  
The second gap relates to the variables of our framework themselves. Chiefly, are 
there other variables that hold more explanatory power in terms understanding Gulf Arab 
foreign policy outcomes than those identified by Verhoeven, Meester, and van den Berg? 
One variable critical to the concept of RSCT is that of distance, as Buzan and Wæver 
previously pointed out that “most threats travel more easily over short distances than over 
long ones,” greatly effecting the nature of security interdependence the emergence of 
regionally-based security patterns.370 This research certainly identified a case where we 
were neither able to classify Saudi or Qatari foreign policies as either competitive or 
cooperative. Is this a clear result determining that cooperation and competition are not the 
only clear categories for state behavior? Or is this an indication that our ambiguous results 
were due to a focus on the wrong variables? Further research into this question is highly 
warranted both to help validate the efficacy of this analytical framework or to propose an 
alternative. 
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